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Information Matters in Tax Enforcement 
Leandra Lederman* & Joseph C. Dugan** 
Most scholars recognize both that the government needs information 
about taxpayers’ transactions to determine whether their reporting is 
honest, and that third-party reporting helps the government obtain that 
information. Given governments’ reliance on tax collections, it would be 
risky to think that information or third-party reporting is not needed by 
tax agencies. However, a recent article by Professor Wei Cui asserts that 
“modern governments can practice ‘taxation without information.’” 
Professor Cui’s argument rests on two claims: (1) “giving governments 
effective access to taxpayer information through third parties does not 
explain the success of modern tax administration” because, he argues, 
some important taxes—such as the value added tax (VAT)—do not 
involve information reporting; and (2) modern tax administration 
succeeds because “business firms” are “sites of social cooperation under 
the rule of law,” fostering compliance. Both arguments are mistaken. As 
this Article demonstrates, third-party information reporting is highly 
effective, third-party reporting is used to enforce VATs, and firms are not 
inherently compliant. In fact, where individuals report on firms, firms’ 
compliance increases. This supports the intuitive notion that third-party 
reporting increases tax compliance and that information matters in 
tax enforcement. 
* William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law.
** Associate Attorney, Gallagher Evelius & Jones LLP, Baltimore, MD.
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists and legal experts have long recognized that the 
government needs information about taxpayers’ transactions 
in order to determine whether their reporting is honest. Tax experts 
have likewise long recognized that third-party information 
reporting (TPIR) is an important tool to promote compliance 
with the tax law.1 For example, in its most recent study of 
1. See, e.g., Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from 
a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 653 (2011) (“[O]ur findings 
suggest that tax evasion is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they 
are unable to cheat successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Mark 
D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax Compliance and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data 
Show?, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 531, 563 (2014) (“Using U.S. taxpayer-level data . . . this paper has 
shown that the presence and amount of unmatched income are the primary determinants of 
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tax compliance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported 
the following voluntary (unenforced) compliance rates 
for individuals:2 
Type of Income Voluntary Compliance 
Rate 









“Income subject to some 
information reporting” 
83% 
“Income subject to little or 
no information reporting” 
45% 
These statistics reveal several important comparisons: 
• Substantially complete information reporting by
a third party results in almost as much voluntary
income tax noncompliance.”); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 
21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item by line item, there is a clear positive correlation 
between the rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms such as 
information reports and employer withholding.”). 
2. See IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 
2011–2013, at 14 fig.3 (2019) [hereinafter TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013] 
(emphasis added), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf (showing noncompliance 
rates). The IRS explains its methodology, as well as the limitations of the methodology,  
as follows: 
The estimates were prepared by the IRS and are based on original research and 
analysis conducted or sponsored by the IRS. Estimating the tax gap is inherently 
challenging and requires assessing the merits of alternative methods, 
assumptions, and data sources. There is no single approach that can be used for 
estimating all the components of the tax gap, so multiple methods are used. Each 
approach is subject to non-sampling error; the component estimates that are based 
on samples are further subject to sampling error. The uncertainty of the estimates 
is not readily captured by standard errors that typically accompany estimates 
based on sample data. For that reason, standard errors, confidence intervals, and 
significance tests for statistical comparisons across years are not reported. When 
using these estimates and making comparisons across years, the user should be 
mindful of these limitations. 
Id. at 1. 
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compliance by the individual taxpayer as 
actually having the third party withhold those 
taxes and remit them directly to the government. 
• The extent of information reporting matters.
When only some information about the payment
is reported—rather than most or all of the
information needed for tax reporting—the
compliance rate decreases (from an estimated 95
percent of the dollars due to an estimated 83
percent).
• Individuals have a much lower (45 percent)
estimated compliance rate with respect to
receipts not subject to information reporting,
such as cash received from a small business.
These reductions in estimated tax compliance as third-party 
reporting decreases are consistent over time in IRS studies.3 
Accordingly, the IRS has stated that “[t]he estimates confirm the 
relationship between reporting compliance and third-party 
information reporting that was demonstrated in earlier tax gap 
estimates. For the individual income tax, reporting compliance is 
far higher when income items are subject to information reporting 
and even higher when also subject to withholding.”4 
The logic underlying TPIR relies on a fairly straightforward, 
two-part insight. First, asymmetric information is a core problem 
for modern tax laws because the taxpayer knows the relevant 
facts—such as the details of the transactions that he or she 
engaged in—while the government does not.5 Second, adding a 
third party (generally a payor or recordkeeper) to the taxpayer-
government taxpaying relationship fosters taxpayer compliance 
3. See, e.g., id. at 14 fig.3; IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP 
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 12 fig.1 (2016) [hereinafter TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 
TAX YEARS 2008–2010], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p1415.pdf (showing estimated 
noncompliance rates for the categories in the chart that translate to voluntary compliance 
rates of 99%, 93%, 81%, and 37%); IRS, TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 3 fig.1 (2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf (reflecting compliance 
rates of 99%, 92%, 89%, and 44%); IRS, TAX YEAR 2001 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
UNDERREPORTING GAP 2 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_update_ 
070212.pdf (reflecting compliance rates of 98.8%, 95.5%, 91.4%, and 46.1%). 
4. TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 3, at 11. 
5. Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2010). 
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because the taxpayer no longer acts unobserved. Arm’s-length 
parties with a reporting obligation could collude with the taxpayer 
to underreport, but collusion is riskier than cheating alone, and 
thus less likely. In addition, reporting parties have several 
incentives to comply with their obligations, including the difficulty 
of accomplishing collusion on a large scale and the risk of detection 
and resulting sanctions. 
Yet a 2018 article by Professor Wei Cui, titled Taxation Without 
Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax Collection, 
questions the significance of information reporting, asserting that 
“modern governments can practice ‘taxation without 
information.’”6 Cui’s article argues that (1) “giving governments 
effective access to taxpayer information through third parties does 
not explain the success of modern tax administration”;7 and (2) 
instead, what explains this success is that “business firms”8 are 
“sites of social cooperation under the rule of law,”9 fostering 
compliance. Cui’s article has attracted some attention, with 
Professor Daniel Hemel stating in an online review that he believes 
Cui is “largely right.”10 
While Cui’s contrarian thesis is provocative, this Article shows 
that both of its claims are incorrect. With respect to Cui’s first 
argument, while the success of modern tax administration systems 
may turn on a variety of factors, empirical studies show that 
information sharing—and TPIR in particular—are critical features 
of an effective tax administration strategy.11 This is not to suggest 
6. Wei Cui, Taxation Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax 
Collection, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 93, 146 (2018) (quoting Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Why Can 
Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries, 83 
ECONOMICA 219, 225 fig.2 (2016)). 
7. Id. at 99. 
8. Id. at 100. Cui does not define the term “business firm” or “firm” in his article. His 
usage seems to encompass all businesses, incorporated and unincorporated. See, e.g., id. at 
134 (recognizing that “a ‘firm’ could be a sole business proprietor”). This Article takes the 
same approach. 
9. Id. at 100. 
10. Daniel Hemel, Weekly SSRN Tax Article Review and Roundup, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 
24, 2017), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2017/03/weekly-ssrn-tax-article-
review-and-roundup-3.html. 
11. See infra Section II.A.1. 
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that TPIR is a panacea; Cui is right to recognize that it is not.12 Nor 
is it necessarily the first-best solution.13 But, as discussed below, the 
existing empirical data generally show TPIR to be highly effective.14 
As one of the authors of this Article previously explained, third-
party reporting is generally structured with firms (which are far 
fewer in number) reporting on individuals, both because 
centralization is efficient and because firms typically have more 
sophisticated accounting infrastructures than individuals do.15 This 
typical structure may initially make it difficult to differentiate the 
impact of the firm’s participation in a transaction from that of the 
information reporting itself. However, empirical studies have 
found that information reporting by individuals likewise increases 
firms’ tax compliance—a finding that Cui’s contrarian thesis does 
not explain.16 
Cui’s second argument—that pro-social behavior by firms 
explains the success of modern tax administration—is not correct 
as a theoretical or empirical matter, as discussed below.17 For one 
thing, if firms were inherently pro-social, one would expect even 
small firms to have high tax compliance rates, which Cui 
acknowledges is not the case.18 Instead, small businesses present a 
major enforcement problem.19 Large firms—which are much more 
highly regulated and monitored—generally are more compliant 
12. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1736 (“Information reporting . . . is certainly not a 
panacea. Moreover, it will not be equally effective in all situations.” (footnote omitted)); id. 
at 1739–41 (arguing that some proposals for information reporting are unwise, and 
developing six factors to consult when evaluating proposals for additional information 
reporting in the United States); see also infra note 90 (noting the challenges for TPIR in 
countries where the tax administration lacks the capacity to use the information). 
13. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Section II.A.1; cf. infra text accompanying notes 375–86 (discussing the 
success of programs in which individuals report on transactions with firms). 
15. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1740 (including bookkeeping infrastructure and 
relative centralization of businesses as factors to use when evaluating proposals for 
additional information reporting). 
16. See infra notes 378–91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Sections III.A–III.C. 
18. See Cui, supra note 6, at 105 n.54 (citing Joel Slemrod as “explaining that tax 
enforcement for small businesses is more challenging than for large firms”); id. at 134 
(mentioning “small firms and firms under intense competitive pressure and the fact that 
these firms are more likely to act in disregard of the law than others”); see also infra Section 
III.A.3.a. 
19. See infra Section III.A. 
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but have also committed numerous highly publicized frauds and 
other violations.20 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three principal Parts. 
Part I sets forth the key contentions in Professor Cui’s article, 
including the reasons why he believes TPIR may not adequately 
explain the success of modern tax administration and his notion of 
the business firm as a pro-social locus of compliance. Part II 
challenges Cui’s contentions regarding information reporting, and 
it argues that taxation without information as a theoretical concept 
is inconsistent with empirical data and well-settled norms of 
human behavior. Part III then rebuts Cui’s contention that business 
firms are inherently pro-social. Part III also shows that the existing 
empirical studies find that firms’ tax reporting increases when they 
are monitored by individuals. 
The Article concludes that government access to taxpayer 
information is a linchpin of effective tax administration; third-party 
reporting is a valuable component of such information sharing; and 
firms are not inherently honest, but rather, observability is a key 
factor in tax administration. Accordingly, information sharing is 
central to effective tax enforcement. 
I. TAXATION WITHOUT INFORMATION? PROFESSOR CUI’S
CONTRARIAN THEORY 
Though modern tax administration systems differ in their 
particulars, most include a tax collection authority with civil and 
criminal enforcement powers21 and mechanisms for the tax 
authority to obtain information about taxpayers’ transactions.22 The 
20. See infra Sections III.A.1–A.2. 
21. See OECD, TAX ADMINISTRATION IN OECD AND SELECTED NON-OECD COUNTRIES:
COMPARATIVE INFORMATION SERIES (2008), at 10 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/ 
administration/CIS-2008.pdf (“In virtually all the surveyed countries, the tax system is 
responsible for generating the vast bulk of revenue that is required to fund Government 
services. . . . [R]evenue bodies need adequate powers and autonomy to perform in an 
efficient and effective manner.”); id. at 128 (“While practices vary, a common approach sees 
penalties for minor offences in the region of 10–30% of the tax evaded while more serious 
offences involving deliberate evasion are in the region of 40–100% of the tax evaded.”). 
22. Id. at 121 (“All surveyed revenue bodies have powers to obtain relevant 
information and in 41 out of 43 revenue bodies these powers can extend to third parties. The 
circumstances in which entry and search powers can be used varies between countries, as 
does the use of warrants and the extent of the involvement of other government agencies.”). 
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need for information is intuitive: a government cannot effectively 
tax income sources that are not on its radar.23 
Yet in a startling recent article, Professor Wei Cui argues 
that “modern governments . . . [can] practice precisely ‘taxation 
without information.’”24 
Professor Cui contends that contemporary tax scholarship’s 
“emphasis on TPIR is misplaced”25 and that “TPIR cannot play the 
explanatory role that social scientists have assigned it.”26 Rejecting 
the theory that TPIR facilitates compliance by overcoming an 
information asymmetry, Cui ascribes to TPIR a “quite limited” role 
in tax administration27 because it is “incapable of explaining tax 
compliance by business firms”28 and “no evidence has been 
produced that ‘but for’ TPIR, the level of compliance could not be 
as high as is actually observed.”29 
Cui’s article further argues that “modern governments can 
practice ‘taxation without information’”30 because of the role that 
business firms play in tax administration: “Compliance with legal 
rules and norms, and monitoring the compliance of other parties, 
are intrinsic aspects of the modern business firm as an 
23. For this reason, countries with large cash-based or “shadow” economies tend to 
be countries with high estimated rates of tax evasion. Greece presents a helpful example: one 
study found that two out of three Greek workers understates his or her income, with nearly a 
quarter of all economic activity undeclared. Greece’s Shadow Economy: The Treasures of 
Darkness, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21623742-getting-greeks-pay-more-tax-not-just-hard-risky-treasures. 
24. Cui, supra note 6, at 93 (emphasis added). Cui’s argument focuses on both 
developed and developing countries. See, e.g., id. at 140 (“Understanding the institutional 
foundations of modern taxation has deep policy implications both for developing countries 
aiming to enhance their state capacity and for developed countries like the United 
States . . . .” (footnote omitted)). Cui’s article is not entirely clear as to whether he is making 
a broad claim about all forms of information transmission in tax enforcement, as the 
quotation above suggests, or a narrower claim about TPIR only. It also is not obvious that 
Cui believes governments can, let alone should, practice taxation without information. E.g., 
id. at 145 (“None of the arguments in this Article are meant to suggest that the U.S. should 
roll back any specific type of TPIR that it currently adopts, or to deny that TPIR may have 
assorted benefits for taxpayers.”). In any event, because TPIR is an important example, but 
only one example, of information-sharing mechanisms in tax enforcement, this Article 
emphasizes TPIR but also discusses information more broadly. 
25. Id. at 93. 
26. Id. at 99. 
27. Id. at 104. 
28. Id. at 127. 
29. Id. at 114. 
30. Id. at 146. 
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institution.”31 According to Cui, it is the pro-social tendencies 
among business firms—not information reporting—that explains 
the success of tax administration in advanced economies.32 
Cui’s argument is provocative, but it does not withstand 
scrutiny for three reasons. First, not only does TPIR promote 
compliance with the personal income tax,33 but empirical studies 
have shown that third-party reporting promotes compliance with 
other taxes, such as the value-added tax (VAT).34 Second, in 
contexts in which TPIR is not feasible but compliance remains high, 
other sources of information-transparency serve a similar function 
to TPIR. These reliable information flows include regulatory 
reporting requirements to the taxing authority and to other non-tax 
agencies imposed on business firms, and Cui’s article does not seem 
to address these pressures to comply.35 Third, the available 
evidence indicates that business firms are not intrinsically 
law-abiding.36 The remainder of this Part summarizes Cui’s 
arguments. Parts II and III then respond to and rebut Cui’s 
principal contentions. 
A. Cui’s View of the Role of Information and TPIR
Cui begins with an uncontroversial statement: “[b]uilding 
effective tax administration is one of the most urgent tasks facing 
the poorer countries of the world in their pursuit of sustainable 
development.”37 As Cui acknowledges, existing scholarship 
emphasizes that developed countries, with comparably successful 
tax administration regimes, typically have robust information 
reporting and, in particular, TPIR systems.38 
Yet, Cui believes the emphasis on TPIR is misplaced. Departing 
from the conventional view that taxpayers are more honest when 
31. Id. at 138. 
32. Id. at 100. 
33. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 88–96. 
34. See infra notes 379–80. 
35. See infra Section III.B.1. 
36. See infra Part III. 
37. Cui, supra note 6, at 94–95. 
38. Id. at 96–97.  Examples of TPIR that will be familiar to readers in the United States 
include Form W-2 (by which an employer reports on an employee’s wages) and Form 1099. 
Form 1099 is used by to report on various types of payments, including a payment to a 
contractor (on Form 1099-MISC), a retirement fund beneficiary (Form 1099-R), or an investor 
(Forms 1099-DIV and 1099-INT). 
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they believe the government has access to their information,39 Cui 
questions whether information asymmetry is “the most important 
kind of enforceability constraint for taxes.”40 Cui contends that 
TPIR is “most pronounced in the individual income tax context, 
and only for wage and passive investment income,”41 whereas 
“there is no obvious way in which the corporate income tax is 
enforced through TPIR,”42 and “TPIR with respect to individual 
business income is largely incomplete.”43 In Cui’s view, 
“emphasizing TPIR seems to privilege, without obvious 
justification, (certain elements of) the individual income tax.”44 
Cui contends that the (supposed) lack of third-party reporting 
in the context of VATs or corporate income taxes supports his thesis 
that TPIR is not central to tax enforcement.45 And Professor Daniel 
Hemel agrees, writing that “[Cui] has persuaded me that third 
party reporting is not nearly as integral to tax collection as I 
previously believed.”46 In part that is because Hemel accepts Cui’s 
assertion47 that VATs do not use third-party reporting.48 
39. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-652T, OPPORTUNITIES TO
IMPROVE THE TAXPAYER EXPERIENCE AND VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 8 (2007), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590425.pdf (“IRS research shows that when taxpayers 
know that IRS is receiving data from third parties, they are more likely to correctly report 
the income or expenses to IRS.”); OECD, TECHNOLOGY TOOLS TO TACKLE TAX EVASION AND 
TAX FRAUD 13 tbl.2.1 (2017), https://www.oecd.org/tax/crime/technology-tools-to-tackle-
tax-evasion-and-tax-fraud.pdf (“Regular data transmission of the records to the tax authority 
deters taxpayers from altering records as they know the tax authority will have direct data.”); 
Junmin Wan, The Incentive to Declare Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in 
China, 14 REV. DEV. ECON. 611, 611–12 (2010) (“[L]ike the other countries in the world, 
China’s government suffers the issue of tax evasion because of the asymmetry of 
information. For example, to collect the sales tax . . . , the government needs to obtain 
financial records of transactions between a firm and a consumer . . . .”). 
40. Cui, supra note 6, at 103; see id. at 104. 
41. Id. at 105. 
42. Id. at 104. 
43. Id. at 105. 
44. Id. at 106. 
45. Id. at 105–06. 
46. Hemel, supra note 10. 
47. Id. Hemel’s comment in this regard is addressed below. See infra text 
accompanying note 139. 
48. Cui, supra note 6, at 104 (“Under the VAT . . . , firms generally do not transmit
information about payments to and specific transactions with vendors and customers to the 
government, but instead aggregate transaction information into lines on simple tax 
returns.”). This claim is rebutted below. See infra Section II.B. 
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Cui offers three reasons why TPIR may be less important than 
the literature suggests. First, Cui argues that information 
transmission is illusory in the sense that “for any item of income 
such that there is a payor that possesses both complete information 
about it and control over its payment, information reporting is only 
one among several ways in which the government can collect 
tax.”49 That is, both final withholding (where the payor withholds 
the precise amount of tax due from payment) and the imposition of 
an excise tax on the payor (instead of taxing the payee) are potential 
alternatives to TPIR.50 
Second, Cui argues that payor compliance with reporting 
requirements is a “puzzle.” Why, Cui asks, might third parties 
responsible for TPIR choose to comply with the tax law instead of 
colluding with the income recipients to evade that law?51 As 
discussed below,52 Cui posits that payor firms comply not because 
it necessarily makes economic sense for them to do so, nor because 
they fear sanctions for noncompliance, but because firms are 
inherently law-abiding.53 
Finally, Cui argues that it is difficult to assess the importance of 
TPIR because it is hard to disentangle TPIR from the nature of the 
income itself and the nature of the payor.54 Cui writes that most 
financial transactions create some kind of paper trail, and the mere 
existence of that trail (apart from any TPIR) might induce 
compliance.55 He speculates that the presence of large firms in 
developed economies with relatively high tax compliance may 
better explain such high compliance than does TPIR.56 
B. Cui’s View of the Role of Business Firms
According to Cui, while scholars have traditionally “[thought] 
of business firms as ‘fiscal intermediaries’” that collect and remit 
taxes, a better approach may be to view them “as sites of social 
49. Cui, supra note 6, at 107. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 111. 
52. See infra Section I.B. 
53. Cui, supra note 6, at 138–39. 
54. Id. at 114. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 115. The role of firm size is discussed infra in Section III.C. 
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cooperation under the rule of law.”57 This is so, Cui reasons, both 
because (1) firms are constrained by a wide array of legal rules and 
norms, such that even firms that choose to violate some rules (his 
examples are Volkswagen and Wells Fargo58) comply with many 
others;59 and (2) the worst of the bad actors that violate many rules 
tend to be “small firms and firms [that operate] under intense 
competitive pressure.”60 Cui argues that “few firms are organized 
with the expectation that [they] would deliberately profit from the 
violation of all laws that are profitable to violate, and few firms 
grow and remain competitive by profiting from illegal activities.”61 
In so reasoning, Cui takes issue with an important article on the 
topic of business firms and tax compliance. In 2016, Professors 
Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (KKS) described “a three-tiered . . . 
model” under which business firms report information to the 
government on behalf of individual income earners.62 In theory, 
KKS argued, “the firm and its employees could collude to report 
smaller incomes . . . to the government than those actually 
earned.”63 But “[i]n practice, breakdowns can occur because of 
random shocks such as conflicts between employees and the 
employer, moral concerns of employees or an employee 
accidentally revealing the true business records to tax inspectors.”64 
The more employees a firm retains, the likelier these “breakdowns” 
become.65 Even in a very large firm (say, a multinational 
corporation) with massive resources and thousands of employees, 
“a single employee can denounce collusive tax cheating between 
employees and the employer by . . . revealing true books to the 
government.”66 The KKS model acknowledges that business firms 
play a central role in modern tax administration—not because they 
57. Cui, supra note 6, at 100. 
58. Id. at 131. 
59. Id. at 134. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 219–20.
63. Id. at 220. Cui agrees with this. See Cui, supra note 6, at 113 (“[W]hen parties are 
not subject to the same tax rates . . . the potential will always exist for the parties to collude 
and lower the net payment to the government.”). 
64. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 220. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 241. 
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are inherently pro-social but because there is an inverse correlation 
between the size of a firm and the feasibility of cheating. 
Professor Cui thinks KKS have it backwards. Business firms, he 
argues, do not decide to comply with the tax law only when an 
internal collusive bargain cannot be sustained; “[i]nstead, firms are 
places where members of society actively cooperate under regimes 
of law.”67 Cui’s claim in this regard is that, because the 
development of the modern business firm and the regulatory state 
were intertwined,68 “complying with the tax law, like complying 
with other bodies of laws, is the default option” for firms.69 
Thus, Cui argues that it is the presence of firms, not TPIR, that 
explains the success of modern tax administration. In developing 
his argument, Cui raises the trope that the deterrence model of tax 
compliance, developed by Professors Allingham and Sandmo,70 
does not explain observed compliance levels in developed 
countries.71 Under the deterrence model, the taxpayer compares the 
cost of compliance with the expected cost of evading.72 The reason 
for the trope is that audit and penalty rates may seem to be too low 
in advanced economies such as the United States for a rational 
taxpayer to comply with the tax laws at all,73 yet the IRS 
consistently estimates an overall voluntary compliance rate of over 
67. Cui, supra note 6, at 140. 
68. See id. at 139 (“Because the operation of most business firms was inseparable from 
the implementation and following of legal orders, the decision to comply with the tax law 
was a natural one for firms to make.”). 
69. Id. at 134–35. 
70. Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 
1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 323–26 (1972). The model is based on Gary Becker’s economic model of 
crime. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.  
169 (1968). 
71. See Cui, supra note 6, at 129 (“It has been widely observed that by itself, this simple 
model of the choice about whether to evade taxes seems unable to explain the high level of 
tax compliance observed at least in developed countries: the actual levels of penalties, audits, 
and evasion detected during audits in real life are all far too low to lead a rational individual 
considering only these factors to decide against tax evasion.”). 
72. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1463 (2003). 
73. See J. Manhire, Toward a Perspective-Dependent Theory of Audit Probability for Tax 
Compliance Models, 33 VA. TAX REV. 629, 629 (2014) (“The classic deterrence theory model of 
income tax evasion first articulated in 1972 has met significant criticism because it does not 
comport with the observed rate of tax compliance.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or 
Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377 
(2002) (“Tax compliance rates—which vary dramatically across nations—seem to bear no 
connection to enforcement levels.”). 
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eighty percent.74 A key reason the trope is inaccurate, as one of the 
authors of this Article explained in prior work, is that it treats audits 
as the only detection mechanism, ignoring the fact that information 
reporting makes much income transparent to the tax authority.75 
“Opportunity [to evade] has often been documented as a major 
explanatory factor in non-compliance.”76 
Cui raises the trope because he says that “scholars have 
suggested that the Allingham and Sandmo model can be salvaged 
if one considers the role of business firms.”77 Cui states that these 
scholars argue as follows: 
When firms both automatically provide information to the 
government and maintain information relevant to audits, then the 
probability of detection of tax evasion (conditional upon an audit 
being carried out) is increased. Moreover, when there are fewer 
firms than individual taxpayers, the audit rate for firms is 
higher than for individuals, which also increases the probability 
of detection.78 
74. See TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 2, at 8 fig.1
(estimating an 83.6% voluntary compliance rate); id. at 10 fig.2 (reporting slightly revised 
estimate of 83.8% for tax years 2008–10, of 82.3% for tax year 2006, and of 83.7% for tax year 
2001). Note that the IRS’s voluntary compliance estimates likely are overstated. See TREASURY 
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2013-IE-R008, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NEEDS TO 
IMPROVE THE COMPREHENSIVENESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND TIMELINESS OF THE TAX 
GAP ESTIMATE 2 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2013reports/ 
2013IER008fr.pdf (“[T]he individual income tax underreporting gap estimate could be more 
comprehensive if it included estimates for the informal economy and offshore tax evasion.”). 
75. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 5, at 1738–39 n.18; Leandra Lederman, Statutory 
Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697–99 (2007) 
[hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps]; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the 
Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 974–99 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Reformed IRS]; 
Lederman, supra note 72, at 1460. 
76. Bernadette Kamleitner et al., Tax Compliance of Small Business Owners, 18 INT’L J. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAV. & RES. 330, 335 (2012) (citations omitted) (also noting that where 
noncompliance opportunities exist, inadvertent errors may also increase); see also Kleven et 
al., supra note 1, at 653 (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax evasion is low, not because taxpayers 
are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat successfully due to the widespread 
use of third-party reporting.”); TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 3, 
at 11 (IRS reports that “[f]or the individual income tax, reporting compliance is far higher 
when income items are subject to information reporting[.]”). 
77. Cui, supra note 6, at 129 (citing Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 241; Wojciech Kopczuk 
& Joel Slemrod, Putting Firms into Optimal Tax Theory, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 130, 133–34 (2006)). 
The Kopczuk and Slemrod article does not cite Allingham and Sandmo. Kopczuk & Slemrod, 
supra, at 134 (listing references). 
78. Cui, supra note 6, at 129 (footnote omitted). 
145 Information Matters in Tax Enforcement 
159 
In other words, the presence of firms that serve as information 
reporters increases the likelihood of detection, further deterring 
tax noncompliance.79 Cui argues that this insight “merely begs 
a further question: why do decision-makers in firms—owners, 
managers, and employers—choose not to evade tax? Why do 
they provide accurate information about other taxpayers 
to the government?”80 The answer, Cui argues, is that firms 
are pro-social.81 
Professor Daniel Hemel agrees with Cui’s arguments that TPIR 
is relatively unimportant to tax compliance and that firms are the 
key.82 Where Hemel disagrees with Cui is with respect to Cui’s 
“‘social cooperation’ theory” of firms.83 Hemel states that Cui’s 
claim “is equally consistent with the claim that business firms 
facilitate legal compliance precisely because they fail to engender 
close cooperation among their members.”84 That was also a point 
made by KKS in the article to which Cui’s article responds.85 
79. See Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 75, at 974–99 (“[The] simple comparison of 
relatively high rates of voluntary compliance rates with relatively low audit rates and 
penalties is flawed because it does not account for the role of information reporting and 
withholding in constraining the opportunity to evade tax.”). 
80. Cui, supra note 6, at 129–30. Cui argues in part, 
A typical answer given to this question is that employers can claim deductions for 
wage payments, which lower the employer’s income tax liability. The employee 
and the employer thus have adverse interests, or opposing incentives, with respect 
to reporting wage payments: while the employee stands to lose from employer 
reporting, the employer gains from it. Information reporting is therefore “self-
enforcing.”
Id. at 111–12. The only footnote with a citation is at the end, accompanying the quoted phrase 
“self-enforcing.” Id. The footnote reads, “Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 15, 
at 1739, 1747, 1751 n.93; Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 15, at 711, 729-30.” Id. 
at 112 n.88. However, the first Lederman article cited does not use the phrase “self-enforcing” 
(or variations such as “self-enforced”) anywhere in the article. Lederman, supra note 5, at 
1733–59. The second article uses the phrase only on page 711, stating, “Audit rates are quite 
low, so tax provisions that are effectively self-enforcing are much more administrable than 
provisions that are not self-enforcing.” Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 
711 (footnote omitted). The context there is the structural advantage for tax enforcement that 
exclusions of reimbursed amounts have over deductions for expenditures. See id. 
81. Cui, supra note 6, at 140. 
82. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
83. Hemel, supra note 10. 
84. Id. 
85. See Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 220 (“When a firm has many employees, 
breakdowns of collusion will occur with a high probability. Critically, it is the combination 
of a large number of informed employees, and the existence of business records evidence, 
which makes third-party tax enforcement successful.”). 
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The remainder of this Article demonstrates how the existing 
evidence is inconsistent with Cui’s contrarian thesis. The next Part 
explains the demonstrable significance of information reporting, 
and the final Part rebuts Cui’s argument that business firms are 
inherently pro-social. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TO TAX ENFORCEMENT
This Part demonstrates that the scholarly consensus regarding 
information is well-founded: (1) there can be no effective taxation 
without information, and (2) TPIR is a highly effective means of 
obtaining that information in appropriate contexts. 
A. The Effects of Information Transparency
Although tax evasion is a crime, enforcement authorities have 
finite, sometimes modest, investigative and prosecutorial 
resources,86 making the risk of criminal sanction by itself unlikely 
to deter all evasion.87 Likewise, while the IRS (like comparable tax 
administrative agencies in other advanced economies) conducts 
audits and may impose penalties, the IRS is in a disadvantaged 
position vis-à-vis the taxpayer, as the IRS generally knows 
only what the taxpayer reports—or what others report about 
the taxpayer. 
1. Observability
The literature shows that taxpayers are more compliant when
they believe the government can observe their noncompliance. For 
example, one study found that cash-based business owners 
generally regard credit card receipts as being distinct from cash, 
such that they consistently report the former but not always 
86. The IRS provides an example. See IRS, BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2017, at 2 (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/IRS%20FY%202017%20BIB.pdf (“Over the last 
several years, the IRS has experienced significant budget reductions that are creating serious 
obstacles to its ability to fulfill its mission.”). 
87. In 2018, for example, the IRS initiated 2,886 investigations in total, of which 1,099
were for legal-source tax crimes. It reported 614 incarcerations for legal-source tax crimes. 
IRS, 2018 DATA BOOK 44 tbl.18 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf. The 
likelihood of detection is very important. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, White-Collar Showdown, 
102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 320, 327 (2017) (“Recent data suggest[] . . . that the probability of 
getting caught looms larger [than the penalty] in white-collar criminals’ calculus.”). 
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the latter.88 This suggests that these individuals regard amounts 
with a paper trail as more visible to the government. Similarly, a 
study with respect to Chile’s VAT found that an audit threat from 
the Chilean tax authority resulted in an immediate increase in VAT 
remittances, primarily driven by the transactions for which there is 
no paper trail—sales to consumers—suggesting that the presence 
of a paper trail between firms in the supply chain deters cheating.89 
That study’s author, Dina Pomeranz, referred to the paper trail as 
“the self-enforcing mechanism of the VAT.”90 
Perhaps the starkest example in U.S. history of the relationship 
between information transparency and compliance is when, in the 
mid-1980s, Congress began requiring individual taxpayers to 
provide the Social Security number of anyone age five or older 
whom they claimed as a dependent.91 “Seven million dependents 
88. Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 37, 50 (2009). Taxpayer behavior in the credit-card context also makes TPIR less 
important there. See infra text accompanying note 116. 
89. Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in 
the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2540 (2015). 
90. Id. at 2541. 
A study in Pakistan similarly found “that VAT is indeed self-enforcing.” Mazhar
Waseem, Information, Asymmetric Incentives, or Withholding? Understanding the Self-
Enforcement of Value-Added-Tax 4 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 7736, July 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3422631. That study used the fact that the VAT was phased in 
Pakistan to isolate what caused an increase in reported taxable sales. It found that what is 
effectively a withholding-tax aspect to the VAT caused the increase. Id. at 34. Withholding 
functions as a structural system, constraining noncompliance. See Lederman, Statutory  
Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 697 (explaining the use of withholding as a constraining  
structural mechanism). 
Waseem’s results may reflect the fact that, in a developing country in which 
enforcement capacity is limited, information-transparency in the absence of governmental 
capacity to actually use that information may not have a strong effect on compliance. See 
Waseem, supra, at 10 (“[E]vidence has started to emerge recently that casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of third-party information in [a] low-enforcement-capacity setting. . . .” (citing 
Paul Carrillo et al., Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, 9 AM. 
ECON. J. 144 (2017)). In other words, effective TPIR likely requires a belief on the part of 
taxpayers that governments will receive and make use of the information. See Shekhar Mittal 
& Aprajit Mahajan, VAT in Emerging Economies: Does Third Party Verification Matter? 33 
(Working Paper, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3029963 (finding in a study of Delhi, 
India, that “results suggest that information and monitoring are complements in that we see 
the strongest effect of improved third-party verification from firms that are more likely to 
interact with other registered firms and are more closely monitored by the tax authority.”). 
91. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1524, 100 Stat. 2085, 2749. 
The age threshold was eliminated in 1994, requiring all dependency claims to include an 
identifying number. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,  
108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
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vanished from the tax rolls in 1986, and the IRS recovered $3 billion 
in revenue with a simple enforcement measure . . . . [T]his measure 
worked because taxpayers who had found it easy to cheat 
previously now feared that they could be caught in real-time.”92 
This example shows that self-reporting can be an effective 
compliance mechanism if the risk of detection is (or seems) 
sufficiently high. TPIR—amounts reported by payors on forms 
such as the W-2 or 1099—provides another example of an 
information-sharing mechanism under which the taxpayer knows 
that his or her actions can be observed by the government.93 
Through TPIR, the IRS obtains information about payments from 
payors. If the taxpayer’s reporting differs, the IRS may take action. 
As indicated at the beginning of this Article, IRS studies estimate 
that the percentage of dollars timely and voluntarily paid 
is much higher with partial information reporting—and even 
higher with complete information reporting—than without 
information reporting.94 
The key to TPIR’s effectiveness in increasing up-front 
“voluntary” compliance is that it does not operate only after the 
fact, in the enforcement context. Rather, each taxpayer receives a 
copy of the W-2, 1099, and other information returns sent to the 
government on his or her behalf, and is informed that a copy went 
to the government.95 Accordingly, the taxpayer both benefits from 
92. Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, Stopping VAT Fraud with DICE—Digital 
Invoice Customs Exchange, 72 TAX NOTES INT’L 637, 637 n.3 (2013) (citing STEVEN D. LEVITT & 
STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF 
EVERYTHING 238 (2006)). 
93. See Thomas G. Vitez, Information Reporting and Withholding as Stimulants of 
Voluntary Compliance, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: A REPORT OF THE ABA TAX SECTION 
INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TAX COMPLIANCE 191, 192 (Phillip Sawicki ed., 1983) (“With 
an information document system in place, voluntary compliance rises dramatically because 
the taxpayer is aware that the income is being reported to the IRS and that its omission from 
the tax return is likely to trigger an examination.”). 
94. See supra text accompanying note 2; see also TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 
2011–2013, supra note 2, at 3 (“Based on the TY 2011–2013 estimates, misreporting of income 
amounts subject to substantial information reporting and withholding is 1 percent; of income 
amounts subject to substantial information reporting but not withholding, it is 5 percent; and 
of income amounts subject to little or no information reporting, such as nonfarm proprietor 
income, it is 55 percent.”). 
95. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-266, TAX ADMINISTRATION: COSTS
AND USES OF THIRD-PARTY INFORMATION RETURNS 23 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/270/269658.pdf (“Information reporting involves third-party payers, such as 
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the tax information provided by the third party and knows that 
the government can observe any noncompliance with respect to 
these payments.96 
Information reporting thus decreases the perceived 
opportunity to evade tax. It is not surprising that there is a strong 
correlation between the presence or robustness of TPIR and 
reporting compliance.97 Opportunity is an essential element of 
fraud and similar wrongdoing. As one article stated, “[i]f 
opportunity is not present, fraud is impossible.”98 
Accordingly, contemporary tax scholarship has generally 
emphasized the effectiveness of information reporting in fostering 
compliance.99 For example, KKS argued that “third-party 
information reporting by employers can sustain tax enforcement in 
spite of low fines and low audit rates.”100 Professor Dina Pomeranz 
employers or banks, filing returns with IRS and taxpayers after each calendar year that 
provide information on a variety of taxpayers’ transactions and payments, such as wages 
and miscellaneous income.”). 
96. Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 697 (“‘[I]nformation reporting,’ 
like red light cameras, provides information to the government, and it is information that the 
taxpayer knows the government is receiving.”). 
97. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-18-39, TAX GAP: IRS NEEDS SPECIFIC GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING 
COMPLIANCE 10 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-39.pdf (“As we have 
previously reported, the extent to which individual income tax taxpayers accurately report 
their income is closely aligned to the amount of income that is reported to them and to IRS 
by third parties.”). TPIR is not relevant only for the U.S. federal income tax: a recent study 
found that the introduction of state income tax withholding (and concomitant information 
reporting) by firms has led to, on average, an increase in state income tax revenues of about 
28 percent. See Libor Dušek & Sutirtha Bagchi, Third-Party Reporting and Tax Collections: 
Evidence from the Introduction of Withholding for the State Personal Income Tax 3 (May 2, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1585119. 
98. James A. Tackett et al., A Criminological Perspective of Tax Evasion, 110 TAX NOTES 
654, 655 (2006). The Tackett et al. article describes accounting’s “fraud triangle” and briefly 
applies it to tax evasion. See generally id. 
99. See, e.g., Kleven et al., supra note 1, at 653 (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax evasion 
is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat 
successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Alex Raskolnikov, 
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 
729 (2009) (“It is no accident that for income subject to information reporting and 
withholding at the source, the level of compliance approximates one hundred percent. 
Gamers lacking the opportunity to game the system pay their taxes.” (footnote omitted)). 
100. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 219, 241. 
A recent study found that a society’s “transition from self-employment to employee-
jobs explains growth in tax capacity” and attributes the increased tax capacity to the creation 
of “third-party information trails.” Anders Jensen, Employment Structure and the Rise of the 
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went farther, arguing that “understanding information flows is 
central to effective taxation,” such that there can be “no taxation 
without information.”101 One of the authors of this article has 
likewise argued that information reporting is a “prime example” of 
a technique to solve for information asymmetries.102 
To be sure, information reporting is not a panacea and should 
not apply to every transaction.103 Information transparency, which 
relies on enforcement, is likely not as good as a system that 
constrains compliance ex ante, structurally, particularly in countries 
with low enforcement capacity.104 However, structural systems that 
constrain tax compliance in the way that, for example, speed bumps 
constrain vehicles from speeding, are not always possible to 
implement. Not surprisingly, tax administrations and governments 
have increasingly relied on information reporting and other 
information-sharing mechanisms to spur compliance.105 In fact, the 
global trend is toward more information sharing, not less.106 
Modern Tax System 1 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 25502, 2019), http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w25502. 
101. Pomeranz, supra note 89, at 2539. TPIR, of course, is just one source of information 
for the taxing authority. Self-reporting is another source of information, as is the 
government’s enforcement activities. However, TPIR is particularly helpful because it 
involves the report of a third party that can be compared to the taxpayer’s own report. 
102. Lederman, supra note 5, at 1736; see also id. at 1735 (“The taxpayer’s perception of 
the probability that cheating will be detected influences the compliance decision. 
Accordingly, any information that the taxpayer knows the government has about the 
taxpayer’s activities will foster honesty.”). 
103. See id. at 1736, 1739–41 (mentioning costs as well as benefits, and proposing six 
factors for identifying contexts in which information reporting may be successful). 
104. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 696 (explaining the use of 
structural systems in tax enforcement, and analogizing to speed bumps, which constrain 
speeding structurally and thus require less enforcement than “speed limit” signs); see also 
supra note 90 (mentioning the use of structural mechanisms, such as withholding taxes, that 
foster tax compliance). 
105. For discussion of the role that third-party reporting plays in many countries, see 
section 2.2.2 of the National Reports for the 2018 European Association of Tax Law Professors 
conference. Funda Başaran Yavaşlar & Johanna Hey, TAX TRANSPARENCY 6 (2018), 
http://www.eatlp.org/congresses/310-national-reports-2018 (linking the questionnaire 
and reports for 26 countries). 
106. See Dušek & Bagchi, supra note 97, at 23 (“Expanding third-party information 
reporting has been a common theme in the steps taken by revenue agencies from around the 
world to reduce tax evasion.”). 
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In the United States, for example, Congress has expanded 
domestic TPIR mechanisms over time.107 It also enacted the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010 to tackle 
offshore tax evasion.108 FATCA “requires that foreign financial 
[i]nstitutions and certain other non-financial foreign entities report
on the foreign assets held by their U.S. account holders or be subject
to withholding on withholdable payments.”109
Beyond the United States, the Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS), an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) project inspired by FATCA, provides 
another example of expanded information-sharing. The CRS “calls 
on jurisdictions to obtain information from their financial 
institutions and automatically exchange that information with 
other jurisdictions on an annual basis.”110 “As of February 2020, 
there are over 4000 bilateral exchange relationships activated with 
respect to more than 100 jurisdictions committed to the CRS,” and 
over 100 jurisdictions had signed on to a “multilateral Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.”111 While the 
simple fact that governments are adopting new information-
reporting mechanisms would not by itself prove that such 
mechanisms are effective, the emerging empirical data suggest that 
they are working.112 
107. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1749–51 (discussing the addition of Code section 
6050W, and its accompanying Form 1099-K, as a method for gathering information on 
income produced from online auction sites); id. at 1742 (mentioning the expansion of 
securities broker information-reporting requirements under section 6045 to include 
enhanced basis reporting). 
108. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 
§§ 501–541, 124 Stat. 71, 97–117. 
109. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/foreign-account-tax-compliance-act-fatca (last reviewed Jan. 31, 2020). 
110. OECD, What Is the CRS?, AUTOMATIC EXCH. PORTAL, http://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/common-reporting-standard/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2020). 
111. OECD, International Framework for the CRS, AUTOMATIC EXCH. PORTAL,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2020). 
112. See Niels Johannesen et al., Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. 
Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
24366, 2018), http://www.nber.org/papers/w24366.pdf; id. at 38 (“[W]e find that these 
[U.S.] foreign enforcement initiatives increased the number of individuals reporting foreign 
accounts to the IRS by around 60,000 taxpayers, and increased the total amount of wealth 
disclosed by about $120 billion.”); Robert Goulder, Should the U.S. Adopt the OECD’s Common 
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2. Where TPIR may be less effective
The effectiveness of TPIR in many contexts does not, of course,
mean that TPIR should be deployed in every context. As Professor 
Lederman argued in a 2010 article, certain types of transactions 
lend themselves to TPIR better than others do.113 For example, she 
argued that Form 1099-K, which was slated to be introduced in 2011 
for certain sales (such as those conducted via credit cards) and 
targeted at small businesses such as eBay sellers, held relatively 
limited promise.114 That was because of the form’s high reporting 
threshold (it only applies to sellers conducting over 200 
transactions in a year and receiving over $20,000 in gross proceeds) 
and the fact that it does not include tax basis information.115 
In addition, the evidence that small businesses generally treat credit 
card receipts as fairly transparent116 suggests that TPIR would 
be less effective for transactions that consistently involve 
such receipts. 
Furthermore, as Joel Slemrod et al. pointed out in a 2017 article, 
“[t]axpayers . . . can substitute expense over-reporting for receipt 
under-reporting.”117 Thus, those authors stated that “[t]here is good 
reason to suspect the effect of the Form 1099-K might differ from 
that of existing information reporting.”118 The availability of 
alternative arrangements bears on whether a proposed 
Reporting Standard?, FORBES (June 29, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
taxanalysts/2016/06/29/should-the-u-s-adopt-the-oecds-common-reporting-standard/ 
#c97ffa744af8 (citing 2016 OECD estimate that the “rise of automatic information exchange 
between national revenue bodies” had at that time “already shrunk the global tax gap by 
more than €50 billion”); Robert W. Wood, Incredibly, 48 Nations Embrace FATCA to Reveal U.S. 
Depositors, FORBES (Apr. 7, 2014, 8:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/ 
2014/04/07/incredibly-48-nations-embrace-fatca-to-reveal-u-s-depositors/#5a7cfcea1281 
(describing FATCA as a “bigger success than anyone could have imagined”); see also  
Elisa Casi et al., Cross-Border Tax Evasion After the Common Reporting Standard: Game Over? 4 
(Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Research, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 18-036, 2019), http://ftp.zew.de/ 
pub/zew-docs/dp/dp18036.pdf (“[U]pon the CRS implementation at national level, cross-
border deposits held in offshore countries decrease on average by 11.9% compared to non-
offshore countries.”). 
113. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1739–41 (developing six factors and using them to 
evaluate proposals for additional information reporting). 
114. Id. at 1751–52. 
115. Id. 
116. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
117. Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business 
Tax Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (2017). 
118. Id. 
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information-reporting mechanism likely would succeed in 
increasing compliance.119 
Cui relies on the Slemrod et al. study in support of his critique 
of the importance of TPIR.120 There are two problems with that. 
First, as explained above, the context to which the 1099-K applies 
predictably is a poor fit for information reporting. Second, the 
Slemrod et al. study 
estimate[d] that the introduction of the Form 1099-K prompted a 
24% increase in reported receipts on average for [the subgroup of] 
firms reporting receipts exactly equal to the 1099-K amount. 
Strikingly, this group of firms also increased reported expenses by 
13%. This offsetting moderated the impact of 1099-K on total tax 
liability, even in groups strongly affected by 1099-K.121 
Note that the authors found that the 1099-K initiative had a net 
positive effect, not no effect. The effect was modest in magnitude, 
which is reflective of the context in which it was applied—one that 
is not typical of when information reporting is used successfully. 
As discussed in section II.A above, existing evidence shows TPIR 
generally to be very effective.122 
119. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 1740 (“To the extent the taxpayer has fewer ways to 
cheaply avoid an information reporting requirement, it will be more effective and result in 
fewer distortions.”). 
120. Cui, supra note 6, at 121–27; see also id. at 121 (“The theory just advanced is 
consistent with the very mixed evidence for the effectiveness of TPIR when implemented 
beyond the realm of wage and financial income. A uniquely authoritative study on this topic 
was carried out recently by economists at the IRS and the University of Michigan.”). 
121. Slemrod et al., supra note 117, at 18–19. 
Two studies in developing countries (which have less capacity to enforce the tax laws) 
found much larger increases in offsets following changes in reported revenue. See Carrillo et 
al., supra note 90, at 146 (“[F]irms [in Ecuador] increased reported costs by 96 cents for every 
dollar of revenue adjustment.”); Zareh Asatryan & Andreas Peichl, Responses of Firms to Tax, 
Administrative and Accounting Rules: Evidence from Armenia 30–31 (CESifo, Working Paper, 
Nov. 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6754.html (finding that reported 
income increased after audit but “every additional dollar of reported income in years t to t+1 
is, on average, matched by a 0.90 dollar increase in reported deductions”). Carrillo explains 
that “the effectiveness of third-party reporting in developing economies may be limited 
along two dimensions. . . . [One is that] taxpayers may respond to third-party information 
by making offsetting adjustments on less verifiable margins of the tax return, thereby 
reducing the effect of such information on tax revenue.” Carrillo et al., supra, at 145. 
122. See supra Section II.A. 
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B. Value-Added Taxes and Information Sharing
An important tax used in most advanced economies (but not in 
the United States123) is the VAT (value-added tax). A VAT is a tax 
on goods and services. It “is conceptually similar to a[] [retail sales 
tax], but it is imposed via a mechanism that involves every stage of 
production and distribution.”124 This means that instead of all of the 
tax being collected upon final sale to the consumer, pieces of the tax 
are collected along the entire supply chain. Each business in the 
supply chain is thus subject to VAT. 
Because Cui cited the VAT as an example of a tax not subject to 
TPIR,125 it is important to understand how these taxes work and the 
role that third-party reporting plays in VAT administration. In 
terms of the mechanics of a VAT, Itai Grinberg has provided an 
example involving the sale of a case of wine to a consumer for 
$100.126 As a baseline, if, as in his example, a 20% retail sales tax 
were imposed (which is a much higher rate than U.S. retail sales 
taxes127), the tax due on the sale to the consumer would be $20 (for 
a total cost to the consumer of $120).128 Under a 20% VAT, the 
consumer still pays $120 and the government is still entitled to $20. 
However, the $20 of tax is collected in pieces along the way, rather 
than only from the retailer: 
123. See Sarah Birnbaum, Why Some Experts Want the US to Adopt a VAT and Other Tax 
Lessons from Around the World, PRI’S THE WORLD (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-26/why-some-experts-want-us-adopt-vat-and-
other-tax-lessons-around-world (quoting James Hines as stating, “More than 170 countries 
have value-added taxes . . . . Really, the United States is the only country that doesn’t.”). 
124. Itai Grinberg, Where Credit is Due: Advantages of the Credit-Invoice Method for a Partial 
Replacement VAT, 63 TAX L. REV. 309, 313 (2010). 
125. See Cui, supra note 6, at 104 (“The value added tax (VAT) . . . does not involve 
information reporting . . . . [F]irms generally do not transmit information about payments to 
and specific transactions with vendors and customers to the government, but instead 
aggregate transaction information into lines on simple tax returns.”). But cf. ALAN SCHENK, 
VICTOR THURONYI & WEI CUI, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH  461 (2d ed. 
2015) (describing China’s VAT, under which “tax authorities compare transaction 
information submitted by sellers (through their IC [integrated circuit] cards) with 
information gathered from invoices submitted by purchasers in claiming input tax credits”). 
126. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 314. 
127. See Janelle Cammenga, State and Local Sales Tax Rates, 2019, TAX FOUND., 
https://taxfoundation.org/sales-tax-rates-2019/ (“The five states with the highest average 
combined state and local sales tax rates are Tennessee (9.47 percent), Louisiana (9.45 percent), 
Arkansas (9.43 percent), Washington (9.17 percent), and Alabama (9.14 percent).”). 
128. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 315. 
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A winemaker buys grapes from a grape grower and uses them to 
produce a case of wine for sale to retailers. The winemaker buys 
grapes and other supplies from the grape grower at a cost of $30 
per case of wine before tax. The winemaker sells each case of 
wine for $70 before tax. The retailer sells a case of wine for $100 
before tax. . . . 
 . . . Because the VAT is charged on all sales of taxable goods 
and services (“taxable supplies”), the grape grower collects 20% 
VAT on her sales of grapes, charging the winemaker $6 of tax on 
each $30 of sales. The grape grower remits the $6 of VAT to the 
government. The winemaker charges the retailer $84 ($70 + $14 
[20% of $70] of VAT) per case of wine. Instead of sending all $14 
of VAT to the government, however, the winemaker subtracts the 
$6 of VAT paid by the winemaker to the grape grower from the 
$14 collected in VAT, and remits $8 to the government per case of 
wine sold. Similarly, instead of remitting $20 per case of wine sold 
to the government, the retailer subtracts the $14 of VAT paid by 
the retailer to the winemaker from the $20 collected in VAT from 
the consumer, and remits $6 to the government per case of wine 
sold. The tax authority receives $20 in total—$6 from the grape grower, 
$8 from the winemaker, and $6 from the retailer.129 
The example above includes calculations of the VAT due.130 
There are two principal methods for calculating VAT, the credit-
invoice method and the subtraction method, with almost all 
countries that have VATs using the former.131 The main substantive 
difference between the two methods is that a credit-invoice VAT 
has an invoice requirement.132 That is, while registered businesses 
may reduce their VAT liability by a credit equal to the VAT they 
paid to registered suppliers, taking the credit requires an invoice 
from the supplier.133 Grinberg explains that “[t]he invoice 
129. Id. at 314–15 (emphasis added). 
130. The example above uses the credit-invoice approach. Id. at 309. There is another 
possible approach; the two approaches are described in infra text accompanying  
notes 131–33. 
131. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 309. “Japan is the only developed economy that utilizes 
some subtraction-method features to impose a VAT.” Id. 
132. Id. at 310. 
133. Id. at 313; see also Michel Aujean, Towards a Modern EU VAT System: Associating 
VIVAT and Electronic Invoicing, 20 EUR. CMTY. TAX REV. 211, 215 (2011) (“In most invoice-
credit VAT systems, the invoice plays a central role as it is the commercial document that 
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requirement makes the VAT partially self-policing because 
registered traders demand invoices in order to claim the input 
credits that reduce their own VAT liability.”134 This reporting 
involves third-party information.135 In fact, third parties are 
defines the essential terms of the sale on which VAT will apply and which establishes both 
the VAT due by the seller and the VAT deductible by the purchaser.”). 
In their book on the VAT, Cui and his co-authors note that “[s]ome countries have 
undertaken ambitious programs to match invoices for input credits to output tax reported 
by the purported suppliers.” SCHENK, THURONYI & CUI, supra note 125, at 339. They critique 
this matching effort, stating that “[s]uch an exercise can, however, be problematic, in part 
because many mismatches are a result of errors rather than evasion.” Id. Yet, catching 
reporting errors is the goal of matching, and an error in the taxpayer’s favor is equally costly 
to the government whether it is intentional or inadvertent. In addition, a review of this book 
observes that the book’s “discussion of fraud is rather cursory given the worries (for good or 
bad reasons) about VAT fraud, especially in the EU. Missing trader (or carousel) fraud is the 
most prominent but by no means the only form of VAT fraud, as shown [by] Keen and Smith 
(2006) in their classic (but uncited) paper on VAT and sales tax fraud.” Pierre-Pascal 
Gendron, Book Review: Value Added Tax: A Comparative Approach, Second Edition by Alan 
Schenk, Victor Thuronyi, and Wei Cui, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 247 (2016). 
134. Grinberg, supra note 124, at 313; see also id. at 314 (“The prospect of this type of 
third-party reporting may induce businesses to comply more fully with the law.”). In 
addition, the fact that the businesses earlier in the chain have in effect withheld part of the 
tax, which can be claimed by the businesses later in the chain, see supra text accompanying 
note 129, increases the incentive to comply. See Waseem, supra note 90, at 33. Waseem finds 
that “VAT is indeed self-enforcing. Taxable sales reported by manufacturers rise 
considerably as their exposure to VAT deepens.” Id. at 4. 
VAT invoices are thus useful with respect to the business-to-business part of the 
supply chain. However, the final sale to the consumer traditionally was not transparent to 
the government because the system did not call for the consumer to report to the government 
the total price or amount of VAT he or she paid. Bahro A. Berhan & Glenn P. Jenkins, The 
Economic Cost of “Clever” Tax Administration Ideas, 5 REV. SOC., ECON. & BUS. STUD. 89, 90 
(2004) [hereinafter Berhan & Jenkins, Economic Cost] (“If the seller agrees with the buyer not 
to levy VAT on its final sale, then the government bears the full loss of tax revenue.”). Years 
ago, some countries undertook measures to increase enforcement at the retail stage of the 
transaction by using the consumer as a third party. Id. at 90–91; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 379–91 (discussing lotteries using consumers’ receipts). For example, in 
1986, Bolivia “create[d] another tax—a withholding tax on the payroll of employees and 
pensioners—which can be reduced or eliminated by deducting the VAT paid on purchases, 
documented by official VAT invoices.” Bahro A. Berhan & Glenn P. Jenkins, The High Costs 
of Controlling GST and VAT Evasion, 53 CANADIAN TAX J. 720, 724 (2005). Similarly, Turkey 
introduced a VAT-refund approach for consumers in 1986, id., and Northern Cyprus 
adopted that approach in 1996, id. at 723. 
135. See Jianjun Li & Xuan Wan, Does VAT Have Higher Tax Compliance Than a Turnover 
Tax? Evidence from China, INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. § 2.3 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-
019-09567-4 (“It is generally considered that the VAT system possesses a self-enforcing 
mechanism . . . . Each inter-firm transaction is recorded by the buyer and the seller, which 
generates the third-party information. The third-party information dramatically increases the 
possibility that under-reporting sales and over-reporting costs will be detected.” (emphasis 
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so important to the VAT process that some countries have 
begun imposing third-party liability in VAT fraud cases, such as 
by “refusing the deductibility of input VAT to traders where 
the purchaser of those goods had turned out to be a (missing 
trader) fraudster.”136 
With respect to the role of third-party reporting, Cui claims that 
“[u]nder the VAT . . . firms generally do not transmit information 
about payments to and specific transactions with vendors and 
customers to the government, but instead aggregate transaction 
information into lines on simple tax returns.”137 He adds, “[t]he 
existence of a paper trail does help audits, but it does not 
automatically provide the government with any information before 
an audit.”138 Hemel echoes Cui’s analysis of VAT enforcement, 
stating in part that “the [VATs] that constitute a large source of 
revenue in most countries other than the United States rely 
primarily upon first party reporting. . . . Cui notes that in fact, firms 
generally do not submit information to the government regarding 
specific transactions.”139 However, these descriptions both (1) are 
out of date and (2) only partially capture how VATs used to 
be administered. 
Decades ago, VATs did rely significantly on first-party 
reporting. For example, a book authored by Liam Ebrill et al. and 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2001 
explained that “[u]ntil the early 1990s, all countries willing to 
introduce a VAT broadly followed the same approach—
administrative preparations for implementation of the new tax 
were always based on the assumption that the VAT is a self-
assessed tax.”140 That book further described VATs as closely linked 
added)); see also Waseem, supra note 90, at 10 (using the phrase “Third-Party Information” as 
a heading). 
136. Rita de la Feria, Tax Fraud and the Rule of Law 23 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. 
Taxation, Working Paper, 2018), http://eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk/7281/1/WP1802.pdf. Professor 
de la Feria critiques this “responsibilisation” approach. See id. at 29–31. 
137. Cui, supra note 6, at 104. 
138. Id. at 104 n.48. 
139. Hemel, supra note 10. Hemel adds, “This point surprised me: I had assumed that 
credit invoice method VATs required firms to report information about individual 
transactions with counterparties, against whose returns those reports could be checked.” Id. 
140. LIAM EBRILL ET AL., THE MODERN VAT 138 (2001). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2020 
172 
with self-assessment,141 meaning that taxpayers “calculate and pay 
their own tax liabilities.”142 
That early VATs were premised upon self-assessment did not 
preclude third-party reporting, however. For example, the U.S. 
federal income tax involves both self-assessment143 (taxpayer 
calculation of the tax liability) and third-party reporting of wages, 
interest, and other amounts.144 And the backdrop of the VAT, 
according to Ebrill et al., was the role of third-party invoices in the 
supply chain: “As background, the VAT literature initially 
emphasized the self-checking mechanism of the VAT (through the 
chain of invoices that are required at each stage through 
the retailer).”145 
Taxpayers were not the only ones making use of these 
invoices. Even decades ago, countries were using them to 
facilitate enforcement: 
[T]ax departments usually [would] maintain a system of official
invoices where the invoices/receipts are numbered and the
quantity of invoices/receipts issued to each firm is recorded.
Under such a system, a self-policing mechanism exist[ed] with
respect to the payment of the VAT on the sales of goods and
services between one business and another.146
That is, a business purchasing a supply generally would want 
an official invoice in order to be able to support a deduction for the 
VAT paid.147 The selling business supplying the invoice would then 
141. Id. (“In many countries, the development of self-assessment is closely linked to the 
rise of the VAT.”). 
142. Id. In 2009, one of the authors of The Modern VAT referred to that book as “now 
starting to show its age . . . .” Michael Keen, What Do (and Don’t) We Know About 
the Value Added Tax? A Review of Richard M. Bird and Pierre-Pascal Gendron’s The VAT in 
Developing and Transitional Countries, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 159 (2009). 
143. Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This Return Might Be Correct but Probably Isn’t,”
29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 649 (2010) (“As has been recognized by the Supreme Court, the system 
of self-assessment is the bedrock principal [sic] of our income tax laws . . . .”). 
144. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
145. EBRILL ET AL., supra note 140, at 140. Ebrill et al. add that the chain of VAT invoices 
“could be seen as consistent with implementing self-assessment procedures—if the VAT is a 
‘self-enforced’ tax, it should also be ‘self-assessed.’” Id. 
146. Berhan & Jenkins, Economic Cost, supra note 134, at 90. 
147. See Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know and 
What Can Be Done?, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 861, 865 (2006). Keen and Smith explain: 
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be more likely to remit the VAT collected because it would know 
that the buyer (the third party) planned to report the VAT it paid.148 
The registered invoices allowed authorities to monitor the 
businesses in a supply chain.149 
Cui’s assertion that firms liable for VAT “generally do not 
transmit information about payments to and specific transactions 
with vendors and customers to the government” is at best an 
incomplete and outdated description of VAT administration.150 
Even in the Ebrill et al. survey that was conducted over 20 years 
ago,151 “[o]nly 42 percent of the surveyed countries (13 out of 31) 
ha[d] implemented”152 what the book termed “modern collection 
procedures (using simple filing and payment forms and a self-
assessment system).”153 More of the countries, even at that time “(15 
out of 31), while using self-assessment procedures,” had imposed 
additional requirements.154 “In these [latter] countries, the forms 
may [have] include[d] several pages, with taxpayers sometimes 
requested to attach additional documents (such as copies of 
invoices and import declarations) . . . .”155 
[T]here is an important sense in which the VAT is self-correcting, if not self-
enforcing: if for some reason a supply to some registered trader escapes VAT, that 
missing VAT will be recovered at the next stage in the VAT charged by that trader
on their own sales, since there will in that case be no credit to offset against their 
liability. For all these reasons, traders selling to other businesses have an incentive 
to register to charge the VAT even if their annual turnover is below the threshold 
at which VAT registration is mandatory . . . . 
Id. 
148. See Keen, supra note 142, at 162 (“One argument sometimes made for the VAT, for 
example, is that it can help to propagate compliance: if one firm is registered for the VAT, 
then anyone supplying to it will also want to register and become VAT compliant (because 
then they can themselves reclaim any VAT they have been charged, whilst the VAT they 
have to charge the final seller will simply be credited or refunded by the latter).”). 
149. Id. Writing in 2011, Aujean advocated for electronic invoicing. Aujean, supra note 
133, at 215. Aujean adds, “I do believe that ‘the future of VAT is digital’ . . . .” Id. at 216 
(quoting Richard T. Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud in the EU: A Digital VAT Solution, 42 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 443 (2006)). 
150. Cui, supra note 6, at 104. 
151. EBRILL ET AL., supra note 140, at 139 (referring to “the countries surveyed in 
Chapter 6”); id. at 62 (stating regarding the survey that “[m]ost questionnaires were 
completed in Spring/Summer 1998”). 
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Ebrill et al. criticized the approach of these latter countries, 
referring to these reporting requirements as “complex” and 
involving “excessive data requirements.”156 Their concern was with 
compliance costs157 in light of their apparent doubt that taxpayers 
would take advantage of opportunities to evade.158 But it is 
one thing to assert as a normative matter that detailed reporting is 
too costly or inefficient. It is another thing to claim as an empirical 
matter that detailed reporting is atypical. The Ebrill et al. study 
reflects that, even in 1998, more of the countries surveyed 
required additional documentation than did not, a factual point 
that Cui’s argument overlooks.159 And, as discussed below, in 
recent years, technological developments have led to much more 
line-item reporting.160 
In 2006, Richard Ainsworth argued: 
 The future of the VAT is digital. In the foreseeable future, all 
VAT processes will be automated. VAT determinations, 
156. Id. 
157. See id. (referring to additional filing requirements as “significantly increasing 
compliance costs”). 
158. For example, in its discussion under “What Are the Main Reasons for Resistance 
to Self-Assessment?,” id. at 142, under the claim “Most businesses underreport their tax 
liabilities,” the Ebrill et al. book responds: 
This has also been mentioned in countries in transition. In these countries, a 
number of officials seem to be firmly convinced that taxpayers cannot be trusted, 
especially those in the emerging private sector. However, such reactions should 
gradually decrease as senior tax officials improve their experience with basic tax 
administration principles of market-based economies and taxpayers become more 
familiar with the new tax laws. 
Id. at 143. This suggests the views that the problems are (1) a lack of trust by tax 
administrators (rather than actual noncompliance) and (2) imperfect compliance resulting 
from inexperience. These explanations give little credit to the insights of administrators 
regarding the motivations or actions of taxpayers. They also ignore the fact that “[s]elf-
employed individuals are widely known for evasion of the income tax, and tax 
administrators throughout the world have searched for ways to induce the self-employed to 
comply with their tax obligations.” Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: 
A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 108 (1990). VATs 
have proven to be subject to fraud both in developing and developed countries. See, e.g., 
Keen & Smith, supra note 147, at 862 (“Sri Lanka, for example, has recently lost substantial 
revenue—reportedly about ten percent of its net VAT receipts—from a single fraudulent 
episode. Indeed, the more pervasive informality in developing countries, and typically 
higher levels of corruption, suggest that fraud and evasion are likely to be even greater 
problems there.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 865–68 (providing a typology of VAT fraud); see 
also Ainsworth, supra note 149, at 444–45 (explaining the mechanics of carousel fraud). 
159. See supra text accompanying note 155. 
160. See infra text accompanying notes 163–78. 
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collection, the remission of funds, as well as all reporting, audit, 
and refund activities will be digitized. Certified proprietary and 
third-party software systems will perform all critical VAT functions for 
large and small taxpayers at minimal cost under real-time compliance 
conditions. Government-to-government information exchange 
will be immediate.  
The European Union is transitioning to a digital VAT now.161 
And, in fact, as early as 2005, “the 38 member states of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development” 
agreed to162 what is “[o]ne of the most well-known real-time 
reporting format[s] . . .[—]the SAF-T file which stands for 
‘Standard Audit File for Tax.’”163 Importantly, “[t]he idea behind 
SAF-T is that companies provide governments with full 
transparency towards the company’s business transactions. This 
will enable tax inspectors to audit companies on an ongoing basis, and 
have line-item transaction data available at any time.”164 
SAF-T is thus an electronic file—typically an XML file—that 
“contains reliable accounting data which has been directly 
exported from the company’s accounting system. It will basically 
give the tax authorities . . . easy access to the company’s data in an 
easily readable format.”165 SAF-T is a valuable tool for tax 
administrators to conduct third-party verification. “For example, if 
Company A makes a taxable supply to Company B, Company B’s 
tax inspector will be able to confirm whether Company A has paid 
161. Ainsworth, supra note 149, at 443 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Brazil has used digital invoices “for securing internal data for cross-border supplies 
among the 27 Brazilian states since 2006.” Ainsworth & Todorov, supra note 92, at 638. Brazil 
followed a process of making digital invoices mandatory for companies of a certain size, and 
progressively lowered the size threshold to include more businesses. Id. “[B]y the end of 2010 
there were over 500,000 firms issuing digitally signed, cross-border NF-e invoices. The 
system is fully in place today [(November 2013)].” Id. at 638 n.6. 
162. Standard Audit File for Tax (SAF-T): Online Tax Reporting Forces Transparency, SOVOS
(Sept. 16, 2016) [hereinafter SOVOS], https://sovos.com/blog/standard-audit-file-tax-saf-t-
online-tax-reporting-forces-transparency/. 
163. Sarah Ahlskog & Tuija Kokko, Farewell Paper VAT Returns – Digitalization Hits Also 
the World of VAT, EY (May 29, 2019), https://yrityselaman360blog.ey.com/2019/05/29/ 
farewell-paper-vat-returns-digitalization-hits-also-the-world-of-vat/. This is not the only 
digital reporting format for this data. See id. (“There are also other similar kind of real-time 
reporting requirements within the EU countries, such as the SII (‘Immediate Supply of 
Information’) in Spain and live VAT invoice reporting in Hungary.”). 
164. SOVOS, supra note 162 (emphasis added). 
165. Ahlskog & Kokko, supra note 163. 
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over the VAT, before allowing the VAT refund to Company B.”166 
The first country to adopt SAF-T was Poland, in 2016.167 Now, a 
number of countries use SAF-T for digital reporting: “The SAF-T 
scheme has currently been implemented in Austria, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and France.”168 Norway introduced 
mandatory SAF-T filing effective January 1, 2020.169 
Technology has facilitated line-item reporting. A survey 
conducted by accounting firm Ernst & Young in 2013 found that 
“[i]n 23 countries VAT/GST [Goods & Services Tax] payers must 
provide information about their individual transactions to the tax 
administration.”170 In addition, “[i]n 16 countries VAT/GST payers 
must submit individual tax invoices to the tax administration.”171 
Though the contents of these invoices vary somewhat depending 
on the particular country’s VAT laws, they generally include 
supplier information, recipient information, and details about the 
taxable transaction sufficient to put the taxing authority on notice 
of the transaction.172 
166. SOVOS, supra note 162. 
167. Id. 
168. Ahlskog & Kokko, supra note 163. 
169. Pers Evers & John Henry Askevold Rosseland, Norwegian Standard Audit File – Tax 
(SAF-T) from 1 January 2020, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/no/no/pages/tax/ 
articles/saf-t/english/saf-t-er-vedtatt.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2020); see also The New SAF-T 
Standard Format in Norway Also Apply to NUF / Norwegian Foreign Enterprise, TIMEVAT  
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.timevat.com/en/the-new-saf-t-standard-format-in-norway-
also-apply-to-nuf-norwegian-foreign-enterprise/. 
170. EY GLOBAL SURVEY, VAT/GST ELECTRONIC FILING AND DATA EXTRACTION 5
(2014) (emphasis added), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_VAT-
GST_electronic_filing_and_data_extraction/$FILE/EY-vat-gst-electronic-filing-and-data-
extraction.pdf. Six of the 23 are European Union (EU) countries. Id. at 20. 
171. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Five of the 16 are EU countries (Greece, Hungary, 
Portugal, Spain, and the UK). Id. at 32–33. 
172. See, e.g., VAT Invoicing Rules, TAX’N & CUSTOMS UNION, https://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/business/vat/eu-vat-rules-topic/vat-invoicing-rules_en (last visited Feb. 
4, 2020) (European Commission VAT invoicing rules, requiring in all cases, e.g., the 
supplier’s and customer’s names and addresses; the quantity/extent and type of goods or 
services; and the unit price of goods or services, excluding taxes, discounts, and rebates); 
VAT Record Keeping, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/vat-record-keeping/vat-invoices (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2020) (describing VAT invoices required in the United Kingdom, which 
require, except in the simplified invoice for retail supplies, such things as the supplier’s and 
customer’s names and addresses, a description of the goods or services, and the quantity and 
VAT-exclusive price of each item). 
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And the trend continues to be to require detailed VAT 
reporting.173 Currently, the European Union requires, among other 
things, what is known as a “Recapitulative Statement”174 or “EC 
sales list”175 to accompany the VAT return for sales within the EU, 
for both goods and services.176 
This listing, filed either monthly or quarterly, provides details of 
sales or transfers of goods and services to other VAT registered 
companies in other EU countries. The tax offices in the EU use 
ESLs [EC Sales Lists] to confirm that VAT is being properly and 
fully declared by all parties in cross-border transactions.  
The listing applies to both goods and services.177 
In addition, Intrastat reporting, originally used to track the 
movement of goods within the E.U. for statistical purposes 
“[i]ncreasingly . . . is also being used as a check on potential VAT 
fraud.”178 One writer explains that “businesses are now asked to 
reconcile their VAT returns to their Intrastat filings, in order to 
identify inconsistencies in their VAT compliance.”179 Intrastat 
requires numerous details on the goods, and “Intrastat reporting is 
almost always monthly across the EU. Filings are generally 
undertaken at the same time as the VAT return, and are sent [to] 
173. A report by Avalara states: “The traditional periodic VAT return is headed for 
extinction. . . . The underlying momentum has been to move from the self-assessed, historic 
VAT return towards tax authorities being able to verify live VAT calculations in each 
invoice.” AVALARA, DEATH OF THE EUROPEAN VAT RETURN 2–3, https://www.avalara.com/ 
vatlive/en/white-papers/death-of-the-european-vat-return.html. 
174. Richard Ainsworth, Black Swans: Recapitulative Statements/VIES (VAT) & Use Tax 
Reciprocity (RST), 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 275, 275 (2012) (“The EU has developed a data-sharing 
mechanism involving recapitulative statements by origin state sellers and a VAT Information 
Exchange System (VIES) that shares this information with the destination state.”); id. at 276 
(“VAT registered suppliers in the EU are required to file recapitulative statements (also 
known as EU sales lists or VIES statements).”). 
175. What Is an EC Sales List?, VATGLOBAL, https://www.vatglobal.com/reporting-
obligations-vat-guides/what-is-an-ec-sales-list (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Intrastat Declarations, AVALARA [hereinafter Intrastat Declarations], https://www. 
avalara.com/vatlive/en/eu-vat-rules/eu-vat-returns/intrastat-declarations.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2020). 
179. Giulia Vettore, Intrastat Declaration Made Easy: The Who, Why and How of This EU 
Legal Requirement, ODOO, https://www.odoo.com/blog/business-hacks-1/post/intrastat-
declaration-made-easy-the-who-why-and-how-of-this-eu-legal-requirement-264 (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2020). 
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the appropriate statistical office for the country concerned.”180 
The existence of these overlapping regulatory reporting regimes—
the EC sales list, Intrastat and VAT returns—should be expected to 
increase overall VAT compliance.181 
Moreover, although different countries’ VATs have different 
procedures,182 the modern approach is to require digital real-time 
reporting of transactions to the government. This approach supplies 
transaction-by-transaction information to the tax administration. 
Rwanda adopted digital real-time reporting in 2013,183 
China introduced it in 2015,184 Hungary launched its system on 
180. Intrastat Declarations, supra note 178.
Intrastat filings require details of all dispatches (sales) of goods to other EU 
countries, plus the arrivals (purchase). Details required of each transaction 
include: Description of the goods; Commodity code of the goods; Quantity and 
value of the goods; Delivery terms; Country of departure and arrival (using 
country codes); Any shipping costs. . . . There are annual [Intrastat] reporting 
threshold[s] for each EU country . . . .  
Id.; see also Paul Carrier, An Assessment of Regional Economic Integration Agreements After the 
Uruguay Round, 9 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 27 n.169 (1996) (“The [European Economic 
Community] established a data collecting system called ‘intrastat’ for the purpose of 
measuring trade between member states and trade with non-member states.” (citations 
omitted)); Robin Maxwell et al., Worldwide VAT Update, 17 J. INT’L TAX’N 60, at *4 (2006) (“EU 
member states must collect and report information on intra-Community trade for statistical 
purposes (these reports are known as INTRASTAT).”). 
181. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing overlapping sources of information 
transparency at large firms). 
182. See ERNST & YOUNG, WORLDWIDE VAT, GST AND SALES TAX GUIDE (2019), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-2019-Worldwide-VAT-GST-and-Sales-
Tax-Guide/$FILE/ey-2019-Worldwide-VAT-GST-and-Sales-Tax-Guide.PDF 
(“summariz[ing] indirect tax systems in 124 jurisdictions”). In Europe, for instance, a Council 
Directive, located at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX: 
02006L0112-20190116, sets forth a detailed framework for a European VAT. EU member 
states incorporate the Directive into their statutory schemes, with some discretion. 
183. See Ainsworth & Todorov, supra note 92, at 638; Eva Ghirmai et al., The Incidence 
and Impact of Electronic Billing Machines for VAT in Rwanda, INT’L GROWTH CTR. BLOG (Apr. 
15, 2016), https://www.theigc.org/blog/the-incidence-and-impact-of-electronic-billing-
machines-for-vat-in-rwanda/ (“In August 2013, the Rwandan government passed 
legislation requiring VAT-registered firms to provide customers with a certified Electronic 
Billing Machine (EBM) receipt for each sale. EBMs record and transmit all sales transaction 
data to the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) in real time . . . .”). 
184. STATE ADMIN. OF TAXATION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, STATE TAXATION
ADMINISTRATION ANNUAL REPORT 85 (2018), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/download/ 
pdf/swnb2018en.pdf (“In 2015, the STA [State Taxation Administration] promoted an 
updated VAT invoice system across China . . . . The new system shifts from the offline 
invoicing and regular reporting to online, real-time uploading of information to  
tax administrations.”). 
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July 1, 2018,185 and Italy implemented its system in January 2019.186 
Spain implemented near-real-time reporting in 2017.187 Some 
developed countries have been slower to move to digital real-time 
reporting, but a range of counties have done so, and others are 
expected to follow soon.188 
185. Hungary Real-Time Invoice Reporting, AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/
vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/hungary/hungary-real-time-invoice-reporting.html 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2020) (“From 1 July 2018 Hungary has introduced real-time, electronic 
reporting of domestic B2B [business-to-business] sales invoice data. The anti-VAT fraud 
reporting measure applies to all VAT registered businesses, resident or foreign, on invoices 
with a VAT element of HUF 100,000 (approximately €320) or more.”). 
186. Ahlskog & Kokko, supra note 163 (“Italy also introduced the mandatory e-
invoicing system in January 2019 which requires all companies established in Italy to issue 
and submit domestic invoices electronically in the Italian Revenue Agency’s e-invoicing 
platform called ‘SDI’.”); see also Digitisation of VAT Reporting, AVALARA VATLIVE, (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://www.vatlive.com/vat-news/digitisation-of-vat-reporting/. 
187. See Joe Stanley-Smith, How Spanish SII Is Impacting Companies: Duracell Case Study,
INT’L TAX REV. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.vertexinc.com/sites/default/files/2018-
03/International%20Tax%20Review%20Duracell%20Case%20Study.pdf (“Spain has 
introduced groundbreaking requirements for companies to file transactional data in near 
real-time . . . . its implementation [is] on July 1 2017.”); Real Time Reporting for VAT in Spain, 
LEXIDY (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.lawyersspain.eu/blog/real-time-reporting-for-vat-in-
spain (“According to the new regime, taxpayers have to report within four days those 
transactions for which an invoice was either issued or received. This applies to those 
companies that have a turnover which exceeds 6 million EUR per year: large companies in 
Spain, groups and those types of companies that file monthly VAT returns.”). 
188. See Stanley-Smith, supra note 187, at 2–3 (“‘[I]t’s clearly a trend in the market to go 
to a more digital relationship between taxpayer and government,’” said “Danny Vermeiren, 
director of VAT at Vertex.”); Richard Asquith, Albania Live E-Invoice Reporting 2020, AVALARA 
(Aug. 3, 2019), https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/vat-news/albania-live-e-invoice-
reporting-2020.html (“Albania is to require all taxpayers to submit B2B and B2C [business-
to-consumer] invoices in real-time from 1 January 2020. From 2020, all invoices must be live 
reported to the tax authorities.”); Greece VAT Live Reporting, AVALARA, https://www. 
avalara.com/vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/greece/greek-vat-live-reporting.html 
(last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (“Greece is likely to introduce live invoice reporting and e-invoices 
in January 2020. This will include daily reporting of B2B and B2C invoices through the tax 
authority’s TAXISnet portal. E-invoices for B2G [business-to-government] transactions have 
already been mandated for mid-2019.”).  
Several countries that do not yet have real-time reporting have taken steps in that 
direction, such as by “imposing requirements such as the electronic submission of VAT/GST 
declarations.” Gijsbert Bulk, Indirect Tax in 2017, EY (2017), http://www.ey.com/ 
gl/en/services/tax/vat—gst-and-other-sales-taxes/ey-indirect-tax-in-2017 (also mentioning 
the digital steps taken by Belarus, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, French Polynesia, Hungary, 
Moldova, Puerto Rico, Rwanda, Spain, and Uruguay). The United Kingdom has not 
implemented digital real-time reporting, but beginning on April 1, 2019, “requires VAT 
registered businesses with taxable turnover above the VAT registration threshold to keep 
records in digital form and file their VAT Returns using software.” HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, 
VAT NOTICE 700/22, MAKING TAX DIGITAL FOR VAT ¶ 1.2 (2019), https://www.gov.uk/ 
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Digital real-time reporting may apply to the business-to-
business part of the supply chain and/or to the business-to-
consumer stage.189 The latter stage traditionally has been less 
transparent due to the fact that the consumer often lacked an 
incentive to report the transaction to the tax administration (though 
some countries have tried to address that problem).190 Digital real-
time reporting at the business-to-consumer stage makes that final 
stage in the supply chain more transparent to the tax 
administration through smart cash-register technology: the cash 
register (or its programmer) serves as the third party transmitting 
transaction-by-transaction data to the government in real time.191 
The spread of digital real-time reporting in both the business-
to-business and business-to-consumer parts of the supply chain 
likely speaks to the enforcement advantages that timely, detailed 
transaction data offers to tax administrators, particularly in 
countries that have faced enforcement challenges.192 A study 
focused on Rwanda found that after Rwanda adopted digital 
real-time reporting, VAT payments increased substantially.193 
government/publications/vat-notice-70022-making-tax-digital-for-vat/vat-notice-70022-
making-tax-digital-for-vat. 
189. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 185 (referring to Hungary’s application of 
digital real-time reporting to business-to-business transactions); infra text accompanying 
note 194 (referring to Italy’s application of digital real-time reporting to both business-to-
business and business-to-consumer transactions). 
190. See supra text accompanying note 134 (mentioning some techniques countries used 
to try to address this problem). 
191. The authors thank Tina Ehrke-Rabel for this insight.
192. One article, quoting “an international tax partner and global technology tax leader 
at EY in the United States,” explains that “anti-corruption, electronic submissions and data 
analytics have been identified as a way to push fraud out of the system faster. ‘That’s why 
you are seeing it in countries that tend to have had a more difficult history with tax fraud 
and corruption’ . . . .” Amelia Schwanke, Tax Technology: A Brave New World, 27 INT’L TAX 
REV. 24, 27, 30 (2016). 
193. Ainsworth & Todorov, supra note 92, at 638 n.6.
In 2014, the International Growth Center (IGC) conducted research on the 
incidence of EBM for VAT in Rwanda and found out that, from 2013 to September 
2014, EBM contributed to an increase of VAT payment by 6.5 per cent. More to 
this, the VAT collected on sales declared increased by 20 per cent in 2015 when 
compared to 2014, while in 2016 (January to August), VAT collected from sales 
declared registered an increase of 12 per cent compared to the same period in 2015. 
Eugène Kwibuka, RRA: Use of EBM Will Soon Be Mandatory for Every Business, NEW TIMES 
(Oct. 10, 2016), www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/204315/. 
Russia provides an analogous example: 
145 Information Matters in Tax Enforcement 
181 
Similarly, “Italy is projecting an annual increase in VAT revenues 
of €4 billion for 2019 following the January extension of its 
SdI [Sistema di Interscambio] electronic invoicing regime to 
domestic B2B [business-to-business] and B2C [business-to-
consumer] transactions.”194 
Chile, the focus of the study of VAT compliance by Pomeranz 
that Cui’s article implicitly counters in its title, initially made digital 
reporting optional.195 Thus, at the time of Pomeranz’s study, 2008, 
“[i]n Chile, as in many countries, most firms [did] not have to 
submit [the firm’s book of purchases] to the tax authority. Only 
very large firms, and what was at the time of the study a small 
number who [chose] to use an online filing system, [did] so.”196 
Digital reporting was made mandatory after Pomeranz’s study was 
completed, by a 2014 amendment to the law.197 It is not surprising 
that digital, real-time reporting is the trend: increased government 
access to information in real time not only increases enforcement 
capability, it also deters wrongdoing in the first instance.198 
Thus, Cui’s assertion that third-party reporting does not apply 
to VATs cannot be reconciled with the empirical evidence. 
Starting on January 1 2015, taxpayers in Russia were required to submit VAT 
transactional data along with their electronic VAT returns. That year, domestic 
VAT revenues increased by more than 12%, the equivalent of around $4 billion 
(RUB 267 billion). Was this driven by an improving economy? Perhaps more likely 
is the fact that the Russian Federal Tax Service had delivered on its vision for a 
nationwide VAT analytics platform. 
Jon Dobell, The Future of Tax Technology Is Now, 28 INT’L TAX REV. 41, 41 (2017). 
194. Richard Asquith, Italy SdI VAT E-Invoicing Raises €4bn, AVALARA (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/vat-news/italy-sdi-vat-e-invoicing-raises—
4bn.html. The application to business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions is 
an extension because use of Italy’s SdI electronic invoicing regime “has been required of sales 
to government bodies since June 2014.” Italy Sistema di Interscambio (SdI) Real-Time E-Invoices, 
AVALARA, https://www.avalara.com/vatlive/en/country-guides/europe/italy/italy-sdi-
real-time-e-invoices.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2020). 
195. See Richard T. Ainsworth & Musaad Alwohaibi, GCC VAT: The Intra-Gulf Trade 
Problem, 84 TAX NOTES INT’L 315, 324 (2016). 
196. Pomeranz, supra note 89, at 2543. 
197. See Introduce Modificaciones a la Legislación Tributaria en Materia de Factura Electrónica 
y Dispone Otras Medidas Que Indica, BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE (Oct. 1, 
2014), https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1058909 (providing the text of the law); 
see also Chile Extends DTE Rollout Deadline for SMEs and Microbusinesses, THE PAYPERS (Oct. 
31, 2014), https://www.thepaypers.com/e-invoicing-scf-e-procurement/chile-extends-dte-
rollout-deadline-for-smes-and-microbusinesses/757135-24 (discussing the phase-in of the law). 
198. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 697. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2020 
182 
Invoice matching has been used in many VATs for years,199 and 
more and more countries have moved over time to digital reporting 
of line items and individual transactions. This history both reveals 
that information reporting is highly relevant to VAT administration 
and reinforces that reliable information flows are essential to 
effective tax administration. 
III. THE (NON)COMPLIANCE OF FIRMS
Cui’s article not only downplays the importance of TPIR for tax 
compliance, it also argues that firms foster tax compliance because 
they are “sites of social cooperation under the rule of law.”200 While 
Cui does not provide evidence to support this contrarian assertion, 
this Article undertakes to examine the available evidence. That 
evidence shows not only that firms are not inherently compliant, 
but also that firms (like individuals) are responsive to TPIR. 
A. Are Firms Pro-Social, as Cui Argues?
Cui argues that for “most modern business firms . . . complying 
with the tax law, like complying with other bodies of laws, is the 
default option”201 because “the regulatory state . . . has played a 
crucial role in facilitating the division of economic profit within 
business firms.”202 Cui asserts:  
This dynamic has evolved to a point that firms generally do not 
consider non-compliance with tax law as their default option; 
after all, the tax law is generally enacted and enforced by the same 
governments that have enacted and enforced the other legal rules 
that are crucial to the cohesion of firms.203  
199. See supra text accompanying notes 145–49. 
200. Cui, supra note 6, at 93; id. at 100. 
201. Id. at 134–35 (emphasis added). 
202. Id. at 143. Cui further argues:
[L]egal rules and norms that developed from the 18th to the 20th century . . . 
accompanied the growth of the corporate form: organizational law, antitrust and 
securities regulation, and labor and employment law, in addition to the ever-
present bodies of contract, property, tort and other private law. Because the 
operation of most business firms was inseparable from the implementation and following 
of legal orders, the decision to comply with the tax law was a natural one for firms to make. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
203. Id. at 143. 
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This statement seems to suggest that firms reciprocate the helpful 
regulation they receive by complying with regulations that impose 
costs on firms, but Cui does not cite evidence to support that idea. 
For that matter, Cui’s article does not provide any evidence for 
his claim of default compliance by firms. Instead, it begins 
discussion of the topic by stating, “Consider the postulate that in 
modern (i.e., industrial and post-industrial) economies, most 
business firms operate, for the most part, in compliance with the 
law.”204 If this is true, Cui suggests, “then an important social 
scientific question will be why it is true—what has brought about 
this state of affairs.”205 Of course, this is not evidence, it is merely 
a postulate. 
Cui goes on to explain what he means by the notion that “most 
modern business firms mostly comply with the law”206: 
In other words, for many firms that purposely engage in one type 
of illegal behavior or another, they nonetheless are acting in 
compliance with a wide range of other applicable laws. They do 
not cheat “wherever they can,” in the sense of exploiting every 
opportunity to earn an expected profit by violating the law.207 
That statement is surely true, but contrary to Cui’s argument,208 
we could substitute “individuals” for “firms” in the foregoing 
excerpt from Cui’s article, and the statement would remain just 
as accurate.209 
Accordingly, Cui’s postulate, even if factually true, does not 
show that firms are more honest than individuals. As discussed 
below, it is likely the case that it is easier to engage in bad behavior 
alone than when the behavior requires others to go along with it.210 
However, that says nothing about firms as opposed to individuals 
204. Id. at 133. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 134 (emphasis added). 
207. Id. (emphasis added). 
208. Cui argues that his account of pro-social behavior applies only to firms: “[I]nstead
of postulating general pro-social, norms-respecting motivations for individual taxpayers, the 
account suggests that they will be motivated to act this way . . . in the context of the firm.” 
Id. at 140. 
209. Most individuals comply with a wide range of laws (e.g., they refrain from
committing violent or property crimes), but they may repeatedly break a particular law 
and/or occasionally break other laws (e.g., they may consistently drive over the speed limit 
or occasionally use illegal drugs). 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66; infra text accompanying notes 286–97. 
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acting outside of a firm. For that matter, there is good reason to 
guess that the subset of firms organized as corporations may be less 
compliant than individuals, as corporate existence is inherently tied 
to shareholder wealth maximization,211 and as the corporate 
form shields individuals from direct consequences for many acts 
of misfeasance.212 
1. Noncompliant large firms
In his article, Cui narrows his argument that firms default to
being pro-social to focus on large firms.213 Even with that narrowed 
211. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit 
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[T]he corporate law requires 
directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize 
profits for the stockholders.”); see also MICHAEL L. BENSON & FRANCIS T. CULLEN, COMBATING 
CORPORATE CRIME: LOCAL PROSECUTORS AT WORK 21 (1998) (“The bureaucratic form of 
organization substantially increases efficiency and productivity but it also generates new 
opportunities for criminal behavior . . . . Like the Roman god Janus, the business corporation 
has two faces: producer of stupefying material wealth on one side, and wreaker of financial, 
physical, and environmental havoc on the other.” (citation omitted)). 
An important exception to this single-minded duty of loyalty is for “benefit 
corporations,” a topic Cui’s article does not discuss. While states’ statutory requirements for 
benefit corporations vary, in general, benefit corporations differ from traditional for-profit 
corporations in that (1) their articles of incorporation must provide for a public benefit; (2) 
their directors are accountable for considering the impact of a potential corporate action on 
that benefit objective; (3) the firm must publish an annual benefit report; and (4) shareholders 
and others may have standing to hold the firm and its directors/managers accountable to its 
public mission. Joseph Karl Grant, When Making Money and Making a Sustainable and Societal 
Difference Collide: Will Benefit Corporations Succeed or Fail?, 46 IND. L. REV. 581, 584–88 (2013). 
While some benefit corporations undoubtedly do public good, their existence does not show 
that corporations are inherently pro-social. In addition, a firm that is focused on maximizing 
profits might use the benefit corporation model to “greenwash,” that is, to deceive people 
into believing “that it is producing some public benefit.” Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit 
Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public Benefit Corporations, 21 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 525, 528 (2017). 
212. Prosecutions of corporate executives are famously rare. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, 
Why Is It Getting Harder to Prosecute Executives for Corporate Misconduct, 41 VT. L. REV. 503, 521 
(2017) (“Criminal prosecutions of corporate officers have not happened in the last few years 
anyway, and it is getting harder to pursue those cases.”); James B. Stewart, In Corporate 
Crimes, Individual Accountability Is Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/in-corporate-crimes-individual-accountability-is-
elusive.html (“A particularly egregious example is Pfizer, the large pharmaceutical 
company, which appears to have been a serial offender despite a string of nonprosecution 
agreements and guilty pleas in which it promised to behave better. . . . Despite the 
company’s recidivism, none of its senior executives have ever been charged or convicted.”). 
213. See Cui, supra note 6, at 102 (“That large firms tend to be more compliant with the 
tax law (and other types of law) is an important, but not uncommon, observation.”); 
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scope, the argument is difficult to credit, in part because many large 
firms have been caught committing organizational fraud or 
misconduct. Cui mentions a couple of recent examples214: 
Volkswagen’s emissions scandal (installation of a “defeat 
device”)215 and Wells Fargo’s cross-selling scandal (the opening of 
fake accounts in customers’ names).216 Other widely reported 
examples include Enron (accounting);217 Worldcom (accounting);218 
Dewey & LeBoeuf (alleged scheme to defraud creditors);219 and 
Caterpillar (recently alleged tax fraud),220 among many others.221 
As is well known, Enron’s demise alone caused substantial 
losses: “Enron was the seventh-most valuable company in the U.S., 
until the revelation of its use of deceptive accounting devices 
to shift debt off its books and hide corporate losses led to losses 
of more than $100 billion in shareholder equity before it filed 
id. at 135–36 (“The important social scientific question is not why, given the default choice of 
cheating, most (large) firms don’t cheat on their taxes.”). 
214. Id. at 131. 
215. See JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER, FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 
120–22 (2017). 
216. Ethan Wolff-Mann, Every Wells Fargo Consumer Scandal Since 2015: A Timeline,
YAHOO FINANCE (Aug. 8, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/every-wells-fargo-
consumer-scandal-since-2015-timeline-194946222.html. 
217. See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s 
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 72 (2005) (“[S]enior Enron executives set out to manipulate 
Enron’s reported financial data to improve the company’s apparent financial success.”); id. 
at 84 (“Enron was a failing company propped up by accounting games, deceptive 
transactions, and financial statement manipulation.”). 
218. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 357, 358 (2003) (referring to “Worldcom, whose less 
sophisticated accounting fraud led to a larger restatement of earnings, a larger bankruptcy 
filing, and equally far-reaching civil and criminal investigations”). 
219. Edward S. Adams, Lessons from Law Firm Bankruptcies and Proposals for Reform, 55 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 507, 528 (2015) (“In March of 2014, New York prosecutors filed a  
106-count indictment against [former Dewey & LeBoeuf leaders] Davis, DiCarmine, and 
others alleging that [Dewey & LeBoeuf’s] leadership had engaged in a criminal scheme to 
defraud creditors.”).
220. See Jesse Drucker, Caterpillar Is Accused in Report to Federal Investigators of Tax Fraud, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2mDrRtd (describing a government-
commissioned report, in which accounting professor Leslie A. Robinson found that 
Caterpillar failed to follow U.S. tax and accounting rules and opined that the failures  
were deliberate). 
221. See, e.g., Accounting Scandals, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Accounting_scandals (listing numerous accounting scandals, including over 50 since the 
year 2000); cf. MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 9–10 (1980) 
(describing an older, highly publicized scandal, the “Love Canal” environmental contamination). 
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for bankruptcy.”222 But Enron was far from the only large company 
engaging in accounting fraud.223 “The revelation of similar 
misconduct by other corporations (including Dynergy, Adelphia 
Communications, WorldCom, and Global Crossing) also led to 
massive losses.”224 
There are many other examples of misconduct by large 
corporations, as well, involving many different industries.225 
Regarding why that is the case, one study of S&P 500 
manufacturing companies226 found evidence supporting its 
hypothesis that “high-performing firms may engage in corporate 
illegality in order to maintain their performance relative to 
unsustainably high internal aspirations and external 
expectations.”227 That study also found that, unlike less-prominent 
222. Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1481, 1483–84 (2009). Enron’s behavior led to criminal prosecutions. See Sara Sun 
Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us About American 
Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 89, 91 (2004) (“As of July 2004, 
thirty-one persons connected to Enron had been indicted, and roughly one third of those 
have been convicted.”). 
223. Beale, supra note 222, at 1483–84. 
224. Id. at 1484. 
225. For example, one article includes the following descriptions:
In the health care industry, HealthSouth, the nation’s largest operator 
of rehabilitation hospitals and surgery centers, engaged in an accounting fraud 
that inflated earnings and assets by as much as $4.6 billion in order to meet Wall 
Street forecasts. 
 Major European corporations also employed similar deceptive practices. 
Parmalat (a dairy-food giant which was the eighth largest industrial group in Italy 
and represented .8% of the country’s GDP) collapsed in late 2003 after the 
revelation that it had falsified its earning reports for thirteen years, while it was 
losing billions of dollars, and claimed assets in a bank account that did  
not exist. . . . 
 Other corporate wrongdoing involved breaches of environmental or health 
and safety laws. Three major cruise lines—Carnival, Norwegian, and Royal 
Caribbean—pleaded guilty to charges involving the dumping of waste oil, dry 
cleaning chemicals, and other toxic substances, and falsifying records to conceal 
this conduct. 
Beale & Safwat, supra note 222, at 93–94 (footnotes omitted). 
226. Yuri Mishina et al., Why “Good” Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, 
High Expectations, and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 701, 
706 (2010) (“Our sample consisted of all manufacturing firms that were part of the S&P 500 
between 1990 and 1999 and had December 31 fiscal year-ends. The resulting data set 
contained 194 firms and 1,749 firm-year observations.”). 
227. Id. at 703. One possible explanation they propose for these results is loss aversion 
on the part of top managers. Id. at 716. 
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firms, “prominent firms became increasingly likely to engage in 
corporate illegality the higher investors’ expectations.”228 
Moreover, some of the largest modern firms have intentionally 
noncompliant aspects to their business model.229 In a recent article 
titled Corporate Disobedience, Professor Elizabeth Pollman discusses 
examples such as the ride-sharing giant Uber, which “launched 
operations in cities around the world—often in violation of existing 
laws or, at best, in legal gray areas,”230 and Google, which has 
“tested legal boundaries” with such activities as “collecting street 
views around the globe.”231 As Professor Pollman observes, some 
scholars have gone so far as to suggest that firms should violate 
some laws in some circumstances.232 
Corporate misconduct is not necessarily a one-off event, 
either.233 For example, David Uhlmann reports that the 2010 
explosion at Massey Energy’s West Virginia mine (the Upper Big 
Branch mine) that killed twenty-nine people was caused by 
228. Id. at 716. “[T]he propensity of less prominent firms to engage in illegal actions 
remained relatively stable, regardless of their performance relative to investor’s 
expectations.” Id. The study “used presence on Fortune’s Most Admired Companies list as an 
indication of prominence. . . . creat[ing] a dichotomous variable that took the value 1 if a firm 
appeared on the list in a given year and 0 otherwise.” Id. at 708. 
229. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 710, 716 (2019) 
(“Examining corporate disobedience reveals that there is a wide array of lawbreaking, 
ranging from truly repugnant activity that has no redeeming social value to innovative 
entrepreneurship that arguably falls into a legal gray area or transgresses laws made in a 
different technological or social age.”). 
230. Id. at 712. 
231. Id. at 736. 
232. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to 
obey economic regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the 
importance of these laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of 
how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules . . . [, and] managers not 
only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”). 
233. See Marshall B. Clinard, Corporate Crime: Yesterday and Today—A Comparison, in 
MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME ix, xix (2005) (stating that 
“[r]ecidivism among corporations continues into the 2000s” and including as an example 
that “Multinational Monitor . . . has compiled a list of forty-two major law violations of 
General Electric between 1990 and 2001” (citation omitted)). In Clinard & Yeager’s study of 
582 corporations, they found that “for those firms that had at least one [federal enforcement] 
action brought against them [in 1975 or 1976], the average was 4.4 cases.” CLINARD & 
YEAGER, supra note 221, at 113. They further state that “200 corporations, or 42 percent of the 
total, had multiple charges against them in 1975–1976.” Id. at 116. This study is described 
further in infra text accompanying notes 250–55. 
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repeated unlawful practices.234 “In January 2008, Massey paid 
a then-record $20 million in civil penalties for thousands of 
violations of the Clean Water Act committed between January 2000 
and December 2006. At the Upper Big Branch mine, Massey 
had a methane explosion in 1997, and near misses in 2003 
and 2004 . . . .”235 
Similarly, “Volkswagen had been accused of deploying defeat 
devices as far back as 1973. The company . . . paid $120,000 [then] 
to settle with the Environmental Protection Agency. In 2005, 
Volkswagen paid a $1.1 million penalty for failing to notify the EPA 
of emissions problems in some cars manufactured in Mexico.”236 In 
his 2017 book about the Volkswagen emissions scandal, Jack Ewing 
reports that, in 2006, when Volkswagen engineers worked on 
adapting software Audi used in its diesel engines, they found that 
that software already contained a defeat device.237 Volkswagen 
persisted in this behavior. For example, Ewing reports that, in 2015, 
when Volkswagen recalled cars emitting excess emissions, 
“Volkswagen brazenly used the recall to enhance the effectiveness 
of the defeat device.”238 
Misconduct also is not necessarily confined to one firm within 
an industry.239 For example, Ewing states that in deciding whether 
to actually deploy a defeat device in Volkswagen engines, some 
employees reportedly argued that “all the carmakers cheated. 
Volkswagen had to take shortcuts, too, or it wouldn’t be able 
234. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1295–96 (2013) (discussing 
Massey’s practices of intimidating workers and maintaining dual sets of books to deceive 
safety inspectors). 
235. Id. at 1296. 
236. EWING, supra note 215, at 123. 
237. Id. at 120. 
238. Id. at 183. 
239. See, e.g., CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 221, at 8 (referring, among other things, to 
“the electrical price-fixing conspiracy of the 1960s that involved 29 electrical equipment 
manufacturing companies”); id. at 119 (finding in their study of 582 corporations regarding 
federal enforcement actions brought in 1975–1976, that corporations in “[t]he oil, 
pharmaceutical, and motor vehicle industries were the most likely to” be the subject of 
enforcement lawsuits); Beale & Safwat, supra note 222, at 94–95 (describing misconduct 
allegations of major pharmaceutical companies and citing the following amounts reported 
in 2003 to 2004 as paid by those companies in response: over $86 million by GlaxoSmithKline, 
$271 million by Bayer, $355 million by AstraZeneca, $430 million by Pfizer, and over $622 
million by Abbott Laboratories); see also infra text accompanying notes 240–44. 
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to compete.”240 Marshall Clinard labeled the oil industry “One of 
the Worst,” referring, in part, to violations during the 1990s and 
2000s.241 And Professor Sara Sun Beale wrote in 2009: 
In the past decade, virtually every major pharmaceutical 
company has pled guilty to or settled charges arising out of 
serious misconduct. In the previous decade, the 1990s, the most 
prominent cases concerned antitrust violations. The largest single 
fine imposed was $500 million for a worldwide scheme to fix the 
price of vitamins, and fines from the nine most serious antitrust 
cases of the decade totaled $1.2 billion.242 
Corporate misconduct was also rampant during the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1970s,243 and more recently in the lead-up 
to the Great Recession of the late 2000s.244 There are also 
older examples:  
Historically, we can find evidence of business “crime waves” 
in the United States that date back to the early 19th century . . . . 
The notion of crime waves is especially supported by patterns of 
financial crime. In the 1920s, broad patterns of financial abuses at 
major banks joined other patterns of fraud to contribute to the 
national stock market crash of 1929.245 
Thus, large firms are far from exempt from committing 
misconduct. In fact, corporate misconduct may sometimes involve 
most of the major players in an industry. One scholar has further 
240. EWING, supra note 215, at 122. 
241. Clinard, supra note 233. He also referenced his study of violations committed in 
1975–76. Id. 
242. Beale, supra note 222, at 1484 (footnotes omitted). Clinard labels the 
pharmaceutical industry “The Worst.” Clinard, supra note 233. 
243. See Savings and Loan Crisis: Federal Response to Fraud in Financial Institutions, Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990), https://www.gao. 
gov/assets/110/103444.pdf (statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, 
General Government Programs) (“GAO estimates that losses from thrift failures could be as 
much as $500 billion in the next forty years. Though the extent to which fraud contributed to 
or caused thrift and bank failures is not known, fraud has played a significant role . . . . U.S. 
attorneys . . . are in the process of prosecuting thousands of financial institutions’ officers, 
directors, major borrowers, accounting firms, law firms, and others.”). 
244. See, e.g., Anton R. Valukas, White-Collar Crime and Economic Recession, 2010 U. CHI.
L. FORUM 1, 5–6; Binyamin Appelbaum, How Mortgage Fraud Made the Financial Crisis Worse, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/upshot/how-
mortgage-fraud-made-the-financial-crisis-worse.html. 
245. Peter Cleary Yeager, The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime, 15 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 439, 441 (2016) (citation omitted). 
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argued that there is a pattern to cycles of white-collar crime, such 
that when the economy is strong, there is a push for deregulation 
that allows malfeasance to go undetected.246 Once a recession 
occurs, “[r]egulators and prosecutors fix their gaze on the business 
world and find no shortage of wrongdoing and corruption. 
Wrongdoing and corruption are not necessarily the cause 
of economic recessions, but typically recessions bring them 
to light.”247 
2. The prevalence of fraud by firms
The examples in the previous section of misconduct by large
firms involve high-profile cases. Those cases offer limited insight 
into the frequency of corporate misconduct. It is difficult to obtain 
precise statistics on the incidence of crimes and other misconduct 
by firms, in part because much corporate crime is unreported.248 But 
available evidence shows that corporate malfeasance is not a rare, 
isolated occurrence.249 For example, in a study of 582 large 
corporations, Clinard and Yeager found that, in 1975 and 1976, “350 
(60.1 percent) had at least one federal action brought against 
them”250—administrative, civil, or criminal.251 Not included in their 
246. Valukas, supra note 244, at 2  (“In good times, the public turns a blind eye to 
questionable practices that develop, but in a recession, a spotlight is shone on people making 
money through dubious means.”). 
247. Id. at 4. 
248. Clinard, supra note 233 (“[C]orporate illegal violations are not reported in central 
sources like the Uniform Crime Reports.”); cf. Sally S. Simpson et al., Measuring Corporate 
Crime, in UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CRIMINALITY 115, 122 (Michael B. Blankenship ed., 
1993) (stating that in many of the sources of data they cite, such as court records and 
corporate self-reports to regulatory agencies, “[a]s officially generated statistics, only a 
portion of the incidence of corporate crime is captured within them”). 
249. See Brickey, supra note 218, at 358 (“In the beginning, it was widely assumed that
the Enron scandal was an anomaly. But it soon became clear that this was anything but an 
isolated case of financial accounting fraud at a major corporation . . . . Federal and state 
regulators have since initiated fraud investigations involving dozens of corporations, 
including Adelphia, HealthSouth, McKesson, Tyco, and Qwest. To date [in 2003], some 
ninety corporate owners, executives, and employees have been criminally charged, and the 
investigations are ongoing.”). 
250. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 221, at 113. 
251. Id. at 110. This study is decades old but has the advantage of being detailed. 
Clinard wrote in 2005 that “[i]t is impossible to state whether corporate crime is greater in 
the 2000s than in the 1970s. Since then no studies comparable to Corporate Crime have been 
made.” Clinard, supra note 233. 
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study were undetected violations;252 misconduct that was detected 
by federal agencies but not pursued;253 “data on certain types of 
agency cases, such as most cases involving taxes;”254 and “detected 
violations responded to informally, for example, by telephone.”255 
The authors caution that “[w]hat is represented here, then, are only 
minimal figures of government actions against major corporations: 
the undercount may be as high as one-fourth to one-third.”256 
More recently, former Attorney General Eric Holder stated in 
2014, “the Justice Department has brought over 60 cases against 
financial institutions since 2009, resulting in recoveries totaling 
over $85 billion.”257 And this is despite the fact that banking fraud 
often is difficult to detect.258 Looking beyond financial institutions, 
between 2004 and 2014, the Justice Department initiated 3,270 
corporate prosecutions, for an average of 297 prosecutions per year, 
though the number trended downward over that period.259 
Although these numbers are not large in the context of the total 
number of corporations, they reflect only U.S. federal crimes, 
and only actual prosecutions, so they reflect only a subset of 
corporate crimes.260 
Crimes for which firms are prosecuted may actually reflect only 
a small percentage of corporate crimes, as such wrongdoing may 
252. CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 221, at 112 n.8. 
253. Id. at 111. 
254. Id. at 112. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. (emphasis removed). 
257. Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law 
(Sept. 17, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-
financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law. 
258. Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fine-against-wellsfargo-
points-to-the-failure-of-regulation (reporting, after talking with an expert, that “it is 
incredibly easy for banks to conceal their bad behavior”). 
259. See Justice Department Data Reveal 29 Percent Drop in Criminal Prosecutions of
Corporations, TRAC REPORTS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/406/. 
260. Not only do these statistics not reflect state and foreign prosecutions, they do not 
reflect undetected crimes and crimes that are not prosecuted. “Over the past 10 years, 
occupational fraud referrals to prosecution declined 16%” and the “top reason for non-
referrals was fear of bad publicity.” ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, REPORT TO THE 
NATIONS: 2018 GLOBAL STUDY ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 5 (2018), 
https://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2018/RTTN-
Government-Edition.pdf. 
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often be undetected or go unprosecuted.261 In his book containing 
in-depth case studies and analysis of corporate fraud, John O’Gara 
concludes, “[m]ajor management fraud262 . . . is significantly 
underdetected. Moreover, when this type of fraud is recognized, it 
is all too frequently not prosecuted. The risk/reward implications 
of underdetection and underprosecution are obvious.”263 
Thus, corporate crime and other misconduct is hardly rare or 
isolated, even among large firms. There are numerous examples of 
industry-wide corporate misconduct.264 Corporate wrongdoing is 
also quite costly.265 As one example, in the 2008 financial crisis, 
“corporate misconduct and malfeasance destabilized the stock 
market and led to the loss of billions in shareholder equity and the 
loss of tens (or perhaps even hundreds) of thousands of jobs.”266 
More generally, “many believe [corporate crime] dwarfs the total 
annual loss from street crime.”267 
3. Tax noncompliance by firms
Having a business infrastructure that includes professional
bookkeeping should facilitate tax compliance.268 It is possible that 
some firms committing non-tax malfeasance are fully compliant 
261. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 211, at 27 (describing the special difficulties in 
identifying and prosecuting corporate crime). 
262. “Management fraud (financial statement fraud)” is fraud on behalf of a firm. W. 
STEVE ALBRECHT ET AL., FRAUD EXAMINATION 9–10 (4th ed. 2011). Corporate and 
occupational crime may be thought of as on a continuum because some crimes benefit only 
the corporation, some only the worker, and some benefit both. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 
211, at 22. 
263. JOHN D. O’GARA, CORPORATE FRAUD: CASE STUDIES IN DETECTION AND
PREVENTION 149 (2004); infra Section III.A.2. O’Gara’s view that significant management 
fraud often is undetected stems from “deductive reasoning, a considerable amount of 
experience, and a dash of intuition.” O’GARA, supra. 
264. See Beale, supra note 222, at 1483; supra notes 239–45 and accompanying text. 
265. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2018 Report to the Nations examined
occupational fraud. It found that “financial statement fraud schemes are the least common 
and most costly” at 10% of fraud cases but with a median loss of $800,000. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED 
FRAUD EXAM’RS, supra note 260, at 4. 
266. Beale, supra note 222, at 1483. 
267. BENSON & CULLEN, supra note 211, at 22 (citations omitted); see also Clinard, supra 
note 233, at xii (“The cost of corporate crime far exceeds the total for all the thefts, burglaries, 
arsons, and robberies put together.”). 
268. Cf. Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 283, 309 (2018) (“With an extant bookkeeping infrastructure, the costs of [third-party] 
reporting compliance necessarily decrease, making reporting less burdensome.”).
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with their tax obligations—though tax violations may also result 
from some non-tax malfeasance.269 Regardless, firms are certainly 
not immune from tax violations. It is difficult to find statistics on 
the actual frequency of tax evasion, given its inherently secret 
nature. However, a study of corporations using IRS Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program data for the 1980 tax year270 
“reveal[ed] pervasive noncompliance—two-thirds of the sample 
corporations [we]re noncompliant—that involve[d] a substantial 
share of profits.”271 The problem is not limited to the United States. 
For example, a recent tax compliance paper found that, in 
Ecuador, “there is widespread misreporting in the universe of 
incorporated firms.”272 
More generally, it is well known that small businesses present 
a tax compliance problem worldwide.273 Large firms also can be 
269. See Grant Richardson et al., Corporate Profiling of Tax-Malfeasance: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Assessment of Tax-Audited Australia Firms, 12 EJOURNAL OF TAX RES. 359, 366 
(discussing an Australian case study that “suggests that even if the primary incentive by a 
firm is a [corporate malfeasance] other than tax malfeasance, tax malfeasance and/or 
misfeasance is almost inevitable as an element of such behaviors”). 
Note that firms that fraudulently inflate their earnings may actually pay more tax than 
is actually due to conceal the accounting fraud. See, e.g., Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will 
Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent 
Earnings, 79 ACCT. REV. 388, 389 (2004) (finding, across 27 firms, that the “mean firm paid 
approximately $11.84 million in taxes on the overstated earnings, an amount equal to 1.3 
percent of the market value of the firms”). 
270. Eric Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations, 
in JOEL SLEMROD, ED., WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 125, 153 app. A (1992). The study focused on 
medium-sized corporations. Id. at 132. 
271. Id. at 126. Approximately 6 percent of the corporations overstated income, but the 
median amount of tax overpaid was under $1,000. Id. at 138 tbl.5. Another study, using IRS 
data from 1961 to 1987, found that “[t]he empirical results indicate that audits act as an 
effective deterrent to corporate noncompliance and that greater audit coverage could lead to 
substantial increases in revenues.” Nipoli Kamdar, Corporate Income Tax Compliance: A Time 
Series Analysis, 25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 37, 45–46 (1997) (estimating that “the fraction of true 
tax liability reported increases by 0.336 of a percentage point when the audit rate increases 
by a percentage point”). 
272. Carrillo et al., supra note 121, at 145. Third-party reporting is used in Ecuador but 
was not being enforced, and the authors found that “[s]elf-reported revenue is lower than 
third-party reports in 24 percent of filings, suggesting substantial scope for revenue 
collection through enforcement based on third-party information.” Id. 
273. See, e.g., Michael Engelschalk & Jan Loeprick, The Taxation of Micro and Small 
Businesses in Transition Economies, 2 J. TAX ADMIN. 145 (2016) (discussing efforts at 
implementing simplified small business tax regimes in developing countries and the failures 
or shortcomings of these regimes); Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: 
A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 113–16 (1990)  
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noncompliant with their tax obligations, sometimes leading to 
major scandals. These two contexts are discussed, in turn, below. 
a. The role of firm size: Why aren’t small firms more tax compliant?
Cui notes that large firms tend to be more compliant than small 
ones.274 He does not specify what he means by a “large” or “small” 
firm. However, studies generally do find that larger firms—
measured a number of ways (such as by asset value or annual 
receipts)—are more tax compliant.275 For example, James Alm and 
Chandler McClellan found in a dataset of 8,500 firms from 34 
countries that “a one percent increase in revenue increases revenue 
reported for tax purposes by 3.77 percentage points, so that larger 
(“Self-employed individuals engaged in business, the professions, and agriculture are 
sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘hard-to-tax.’”). 
274. See Cui, supra note 6, at 138 (arguing that “the basic reason that large firms are 
more likely to be compliant is not that the probability of motivated whistleblowers is higher 
in them (or that they have greater external visibility)”). 
275. See, e.g., SANTIAGO LEVY, GOOD INTENTIONS, BAD OUTCOMES: SOCIAL POLICY,
INFORMALITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MEXICO 182 figs.7-2 & 7-3 (2008) (showing the 
declining percentage of illegal (undeclared) employees by increasing firm size and the 
percentage of illegal (unregistered) firms by increasing firm size); Pierre Bachas et al., Size 
Dependent Tax Enforcement and Compliance: Global Evidence and Aggregate Implications 17–19 
(World Bank Grp. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 8363, March 2018) (“[A] 10 percentile 
increase in the WBES size-rank is associated with a 5.2 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of full compliance . . . . [Statistical analysis] suggests that firms depress their 
reported size in order to reduce tax compliance.”); Thomas Kenyon, Tax Evasion, Disclosure, 
and Participation in Financial Markets: Evidence from Brazilian Firms, 36 WORLD DEV. 2512, 2512 
(2008) (“[L]arger Brazilian manufacturing firms declare a greater proportion of their 
activities to the tax and labor authorities, but that the difference is small: a doubling of firm 
size is associated with an increase of just 4 percentage points in the fraction of sales 
reported.”); Todd Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from Mexico 16 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 19385, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19385.pdf (“A key empirical implication of our model . . . 
is that there is less evasion in larger firms.”); id. at 18 (“[I]t appears robust that evasion is 
lower in 11–50 employee firms than in 1–10 employee firms (the omitted category), and lower 
still in 250+ employee firms.”). 
Some studies find the opposite. In a study of 30,000 corporations with assets under $10 
million, Eric Rice found that greater “value added” (defined as “taxable income plus salaries, 
wages, and officers’ remuneration”) correlated with increased underreporting. Rice, supra 
note 270, at 143, 152; see also Noor Sharoja Sapiei et al., Determinants of Tax Compliance 
Behaviour of Corporate Taxpayers in Malaysia, 12 EJOURNAL TAX RSCH. 383, 403 (2014) 
(“Business size . . . is a significant determinant of the under-reporting of income and overall 
non-compliance. Medium-sized [publicly listed companies] PLCs with annual sales turnover 
of between MYR100 and MYR500 million were observed to be more non-compliant  
than small-sized PLCs. To a lesser extent, larger PLCs were more non-compliant than the 
smaller PLCs.”). 
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firms are more compliant.”276 KKS’s study found that, in Denmark, 
estimated tax evasion by firms decreases as the number of 
employees increases.277 These studies and several others278 suggest 
that larger firm size (measured in various ways) positively 
correlates with tax compliance. The evidence that compliance level 
varies with firm size suggests that it is not the firm itself that 
promotes honesty. 
Cui states that “in economists’ use of the term, a ‘firm’ could be 
a sole business proprietor. A small firm’s behavior would not be 
distinguishable from the behavior of its few individual owners or 
employees . . . .”279 However, the studies do not find a cliff effect 
dividing individual-like or very small firms from all other firms. 
Instead, they generally find progressively increasing tax 
compliance with increases in firm size.280 
In addition, IRS data suggest that the average small firm’s 
voluntary compliance rate is likely much lower than that of the 
average individual.281 Recall that the IRS estimates the voluntary 
tax compliance rate with respect to income not subject to 
information reporting at only 45 percent.282 This figure includes 
sole proprietor and farm income and thus reflects at least certain 
types of small businesses.283 By contrast, the average individual 
receives most of his or her income from wages and salaries.284 
276. James Alm & Chandler McClellan, Tax Morale and Tax Compliance from the Firm’s 
Perspective, 65 KYKLOS 1, 4, 12 (2012). 
277. See Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 225–26 & fig.3 (panel B). 
278. See supra note 275. 
279. Cui, supra note 6, at 134. 
280. See supra note 275; supra text accompanying notes 276–77. 
281. In 2001, the IRS’s Small Business and Self-Employed Division, which includes 
individuals with business income and partnerships, S corporations, and C corporations with 
assets up to $10 million, “acknowledge[d] that the largest part of the tax gap can be 
attributed to the taxpayers it serves.” Management Advisory Report: Comparing the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Verification of Income for Wage Earners and Business Taxpayers, Ref. No. 
2001-30-166 at 4, Sept. 2001 (footnote omitted). 
282. See text accompanying supra note 2. The low estimated compliance rate is likely 
largely attributable to the lack of information reporting for self-employment income. See 
Kleven et al., supra note 1, at 670–71. 
283. This category also includes rents and royalties, income from the sale of business 
property on Form 4797, and “other income.” TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, 
supra note 2, at 14 fig.3 & n.6. 
284. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Wages and Salaries Were 92 Percent of 
Income Before Taxes for Consumers Ages 25 to 34 in 2014, TED: THE ECON. DAILY, 
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The IRS estimates the voluntary compliance rate with respect to 
wage and salary income at a much higher 99 percent.285 The IRS 
estimates the overall voluntary tax compliance rate at 83.6 percent, 
which is thus something of an average figure286—and still much 
higher than the IRS’s estimated 45 percent voluntary compliance 
rate on sole proprietor and farm income. 
One reason small firms are less compliant may be that they may 
more easily engage in cash transactions.287 Entrepreneurs may also 
have an above-average taste for risk,288 including for questionable 
tax reporting.289 In his book on corporate fraud, John O’Gara 
describes a case study that “illustrates what could be called 
entrepreneurial risk: Privately held smaller companies, particularly 
those operated by more entrepreneurially inclined executives, have 
a tendency to play fast and loose.”290 
Perhaps most importantly, large firms possess characteristics, 
such as increased transparency, that make them easier to regulate291 
and reduce the practicability of tax evasion.292 Scholars point to 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2016/wages-and-salaries-were-92-percent-of-income-
before-taxes-for-consumers-ages-25-to-34-in-2014.htm (“On average, wages and salaries 
were 77.6 percent of U.S. household income before taxes in 2014.”). 
285. See TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 2, at 14 fig.3. 
286. See id. at 8 fig.1. It is not a true average. The overall rate includes some amounts 
not directly attributable to individuals, such as corporate taxes. See id. 
287. Cf. Morse et al., supra note 88, at 37 (“Underpayment of tax on business income is 
commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”). 
288. See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Jean-Jacques Laffont, A General Equilibrium 
Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion, 87 J. POL. ECON. 719, 720 (1979) 
(finding in a model with a risky firm and a riskless wage that “less risk averse individuals 
become entrepreneurs, while the more risk averse work as laborers”); Galina Vereshchagina 
& Hugo A. Hopenhayn, Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1808, 1810 (2009) 
(“[A] number of explanations have been offered to justify why entrepreneurs might be 
willing to undertake relatively risky activity: they might be overoptimistic, derive utility 
from being their own boss, or be less risk averse than the rest of the population.”). 
289. See Lederman, supra note 72, at 1506 (“It is also possible that those inclined to cheat
on their taxes opt disproportionately to start businesses, at least at the margin.”). 
290. O’GARA, supra note 263, at 31. 
291. See Chang-Tai Hsieh & Benjamin A. Olken, The Missing “Missing Middle”, 28 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 89, 107 (2014) (positing that “a confluence of factors make[s] enforcement of 
such [tax or regulatory] rules easier in larger firms so that costs from regulation are rising 
smoothly in firm size”); see also infra Section III.B.1. 
292. Harris and Todaro (1970) was the first to model the dual economy view that 
large firms are subject to constraints and regulations that small firms are able to 
evade. Their model posits a “modern” sector that pays above-market wages and a 
“traditional” sector that pays market wages. Rauch (1991) formally shows how 
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such factors as the greater difficulty large firms would face in 
keeping transactions off the books;293 the higher likelihood of 
audit;294 the increased reputational risk cheating poses;295 and, for 
publicly traded firms, the opposing financial accounting 
incentives.296 An empirical study using IRS Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program data found that “characteristics that assure 
public disclosure of information about a corporation’s operations,” 
such as “being publicly traded” or “belonging to a highly regulated 
industry,”297 “tend to assure better tax compliance.”298 
b. Tax noncompliance by large firms. As in the non-tax context,
noncompliance is not solely the province of small firms. Numerous 
large corporations have been investigated regarding abusive 
tax-shelter schemes. Examples include Colgate-Palmolive,299 
Dun & Bradstreet,300 Dow Chemical,301 Goldman Sachs,302 
this mechanism can generate a “missing middle” by assuming a fixed threshold 
due to minimum wage laws or labor unions above which firms have to pay above-
market wages.  
Hsieh & Olken, supra note 291, at 107. 
293. Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 227. 
294. See Kumler et al., supra note 275, at 11 (arguing that it may be that “auditors are 
more likely to audit larger firms because their operations are more visible, as suggested by 
Besley and Persson . . .—a conjecture that appears anecdotally to be relevant in Mexico” 
(citing Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Taxation and Development, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PUB. 
ECON. 66 (2013)). 
295. Alm & McClellan, supra note 276, at 12. 
296. Alessandro Santoro, Do Small Businesses Respond to a Change in Tax Audit Rules? 
Evidence from Italy, 45 PUB. FIN. REV. 792, 793 (2017) (citing Michelle Hanlon & Shane 
Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 127 (2010)). Eric Rice pointed out 
several reasons for hypothesizing that publicly traded companies will be more tax compliant. 
See Rice, supra note 270, at 138–39. These include SEC disclosure requirements and the 
incentives of managers and other stakeholders. Id. at 139. 
297. Rice, supra note 270, at 151. The highly regulated industries were banking, real 
estate, investment holding, communications, insurance, securities brokerage, and utilities. 
Id. at 135 tbl.3. 
298. Id. at 151. 
299. See IRS and Merrill Lynch Settle on Tax Shelter Dispute, CFO (Aug. 29, 2001),
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2001/08/irs-and-merrill-lynch-settle-on-tax-
shelter-dispute/. 
300. See id. 
301. See Robert W. Wood, Dow Chemical’s $1 Billion Tax Shelter Stinks, Says Court, FORBES 
(Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/02/27/dow-chemicals-
1-billion-tax-shelter-stinks-says-court/#258679937530. 
302. See id. 
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Santander Holdings,303 Hewlett-Packard,304 Kroger,305 and 
many others.306 
The corporate tax shelter abuses exposed in the early 2000s 
provide an example of the breadth of the problem. For example, 
the U.S. Senate held hearings on abusive tax shelters in 2003307 
and found:  
During the period 1998 to 2003, KPMG devoted substantial 
resources and maintained an extensive infrastructure to produce 
a continuing supply of generic tax products to sell to clients, using 
a process which pressured its tax professionals to generate new 
ideas, move them quickly through the development process, and 
approve, at times, illegal or potentially abusive tax shelters.308  
The hearings further revealed that (1) “[d]uring the period 1998 to 
2002, Ernst & Young sold generic tax products to multiple clients 
despite evidence that some, such as CDS and COBRA, were 
potentially abusive or illegal tax shelters”;309 and (2) “[d]uring the 
period 1997 to 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers sold generic tax 
products to multiple clients, despite evidence that some, such 
as FLIP, CDS, and BOSS, were potentially abusive or illegal 
tax shelters.”310 
Thus, three of the largest and most prominent accounting firms 
in the world were actively engaged for a period of years in the 
development and marketing of abusive tax schemes. In addition, 
the Senate Report included findings regarding other entities 
303. Vidya Kauri, 1st Circ. Reverses Santander’s $234M Foreign Tax Refund Win, LAW360 
(Dec. 16, 2016, 9:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/874096. 
304. Dave Simpson, HP ‘Equity’ Was Actually Debt and a Tax Shelter: 9th Circ., LAW360 
(Nov. 9, 2017, 10:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/983976. 
305. Jon Newberry, Kroger Part of Tax Shelter Probe, CINCINNATI BUS. COURIER (Dec. 2, 
2009, 12:06 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2009/11/30/daily27.html. 
306. See Ryan J. Wilson, An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants, 84 ACCT. 
REV. 969 (2009). 
307. TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS,
ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 303 (2014). 
308. U.S. Senate, The Role of Professional Firms in the U.S. Tax Shelter Industry, Report 
Prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs (Feb. 8, 2005), at 6, http://www.quatloos.com/ 
Tax_Shelter_Industry_Firms.pdf. 
309. Id. CDS stands for Contingent Deferred Swap. Id. at 10. COBRA stands for 
Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives. Id. at 82. 
310. Id. at 7. FLIP stands for Foreign Leveraged Investment Program. BOSS stands for 
Bond and Option Sales Strategy. Id. at 10. 
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involved in these tax shelters, including law firms Sidley Austin 
Brown & Wood and Sutherland Asbill & Brennan; banks Deutsche 
Bank, HVB Bank, UBS Bank, and First Union National Bank; 
and investment advisors Presidio Advisory Services and the 
Quellos Group.311 
More recently, information leaks have provided a window into 
tax malfeasance by large firms.312 For example, some large banks 
have helped wealthy individuals commit offshore tax evasion.313 
Following the scandal involving the European banks UBS and LGT, 
the U.S. Senate conducted hearings and issued a report.314 The 
report found in part that  
[f]rom at least 2000 to 2007, LGT and UBS employed banking
practices that could facilitate, and have resulted in, tax evasion by
their U.S. clients, including assisting clients to open accounts in
the names of offshore entities; advising clients on complex
offshore structures to hide ownership of assets; using client code
names; and disguising asset transfers into and from accounts.315
Thus, history shows that large firms, including some that are 
household names, may fail to comply with their own tax 
obligations and/or assist other taxpayers in noncompliance. 
B. Theorizing Tax and Reporting Compliance by Firms
The previous section established that firms, including 
large ones, are not reliably pro-social. Yet, although third-party 
reporters typically are firms, Part II of this Article showed that 
third-party reporting increases tax compliance in many contexts. 
In Cui’s view, the existing literature does not adequately explain 
the “puzzle of payor compliance.”316 Why might firms often choose 
311. Id. at 7. For example, the Senate found, “Deutsche Bank, HVB Bank, and UBS Bank 
provided billions of dollars in lending critical to transactions which the banks knew were tax 
motivated, involved little or no credit risk, and facilitated potentially abusive or illegal tax 
shelters known as FLIP, OPIS, and BLIPS.” Id. at 111. 
312. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532, 545 (2018). 
313. Id. at 545–48 (discussing the actions of banks UBS and LGT).
314. Id. at 547. 
315. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON TAX 
HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 16 (Comm. Print 2008). The report further found 
that “[b]ank secrecy laws and practices are serving as a cloak . . . for misconduct by banks 
colluding with clients to evade taxes, dodge creditors, and defy court orders.” Id. at 15. 
316. Cui, supra note 6, at 93 (Abstract); id. at 111. 
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to accurately report their employees’ wages instead of “regularly 
colluding with employees in under-reporting wages, and 
bargaining with employees for the benefit of the tax savings from 
such underreporting?”317 
Cui offers and rules out as an explanation the fact that firms can 
deduct wages to reduce business income (and thus tax liability).318 
He also notes and rules out the fact that “[p]ayors are also subject 
to penalties for failing to withhold or report to the government.”319 
However, as discussed below, both of these factors likely do 
contribute to payor compliance, along with other internal and 
external pressures.320 
With respect to the firms’ deduction for wages paid, Cui 
correctly observes that no net revenue will ultimately flow to the 
government where employer and employee are subject to the same 
tax rate, because the tax on the employee’s income would be fully 
offset by the tax savings to the employer from deducting those 
wages.321 Cui thus argues: 
It is when parties are not subject to the same tax rates that the 
government can collect net revenue from a transaction, but then, 
putting aside transaction costs and the failure to reach and 
maintain collusive bargains, the potential will always exist for the 
317. Id. at 111. Cui cites an article by Gideon Yaniv for the proposition that “[u]nder a 
tax withholding system, an employer and his employees may find it mutually beneficial to 
strike a bargain under which the former withholds less than the taxes due . . . while the latter 
accepts less than the free market wage rate.” Gideon Yaniv, Collaborated Employee-Employer 
Tax Evasion, 47 PUB. FIN. 312, 312 (1992). Yaniv’s paper develops an economic model based 
on several assumptions and finds that withholding taxes will actually increase collusion. Id. 
at 320. One of Yaniv’s assumptions is that the tax system does not require the employee to 
file a tax return (that is, the tax system is a final-withholding system). Id. at 314 n.2. That 
assumption does not hold in the United States. “The filing requirement contained in U.S. 
law, see I.R.C. § 6012 . . ., has an enforcement advantage in that the employee, in effect, has 
an incentive to report on the employer.” Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 
733 n.209. While some employers and employees may still collude, such transparency 
provides a deterrent to doing so. 
318. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2018) (allowing a business deduction for “a reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered”); Cui, 
supra note 6, at 112. 
319. Cui, supra note 6, at 112 n.89. 
320. Both of these factors may reduce a firm’s perceived opportunity for 
noncompliance. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
321. Cui, supra note 6, at 113. 
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parties to collude and lower the net payment to the 
government.322  
That is true, but the availability of a deduction for the employer 
reduces the employer’s financial benefit from collusion.323 
This should reduce the likelihood the employer will take the risk 
of cheating. 
With respect to payor penalties, Cui argues: 
Payors are also subject to penalties for failing to withhold or 
report to the government. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PUB. 
55B, DATABOOK 21 (2016) (Rev. 3-2017) (noting that “[t]he IRS 
audited 0.7% of all individual income tax returns filed in CY 2015, 
and 1.1% of corporation income tax returns (excluding S 
corporation returns)”). However, with low audit rates, the 
expected value of such penalties may be very low. While there are 
far fewer employers than employees in any economy, the number 
of employers is generally still too great for tax authorities 
realistically to maintain a high rate of audit coverage. Indeed, the 
audit rate for parties required to perform information reporting is 
not known to be higher than in other areas of tax administration. 
Therefore, a high probability of detection through audits cannot 
be what explains payor compliance.324 
However, the penalty to which Cui refers is not typical, nor is it 
administered like other penalties. Cui’s article does not explain that 
willful failure to collect or pay over withheld taxes is subject to a 
stiff 100% penalty that is applicable to any person responsible for 
collecting or withholding these taxes.325 The 100% penalty is a 
322. Id. 
323. Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 729. For example, if an 
employer pays a nondeductible $100,000 to an employee who has a 25% applicable tax rate, 
$25,000 of tax could theoretically be saved if the employer paid the employee off the books. 
If the employer instead benefitted from a deduction and had a 21% marginal rate (the 
corporate tax rate as of 2020, I.R.C. § 11(b)), reporting the payment would save the employer 
$21,000 in tax, while the employee would owe $25,000. That would leave only $4,000 as the 
possible gains from collusion (rather than $25,000). In the extreme case in which the 
employer and employee’s marginal rates are the same, “the inclusion by the payee is 
cancelled by the deduction by the payor.” Cui, supra note 6, at 113. In other words, if the 
employer’s tax savings exactly equals the employee’s tax liability (when considering all 
applicable taxes), there is no financial incentive to collude. 
324. Cui, supra note 6, at 112 n.89. 
325. See I.R.C. § 6672(a) (2018). The Code provides a right of contribution for a party 
who pays more than his or her share of the penalty. See id. § 6672(d). The 100% penalty is five 
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collection tool that is used to try to protect the very significant 
dollar amounts326 that are required by statute to be “held to be a 
special fund in trust for the United States.”327 Rather than being 
imposed by revenue agents within the Examination function 
following an audit, the 100% penalty may be imposed by revenue 
officers within the Collection function after a business stops paying 
over employment taxes.328 This reduces the opportunity to evade 
taxes, at least for businesses that have paid employment taxes in 
the past. 
Thus, each of these structural aspects of the tax system provides 
a partial explanation for why more firms do not collude with 
their employees. But these are not the only factors that constrain 
firms’ opportunity to commit tax fraud, whether in their payor 
capacity or otherwise. This section discusses additional external 
and internal pressures that may motivate corporate decisionmakers 
to comply, focusing first on the external pressures caused by 
information flows in large firms and then on other pressures, 
particularly internal ones. 
times as high as the general 20% penalty that applies to such things as negligence or 
substantial understatement of tax. See id. § 6662. However, the IRS “typically uses this 
penalty . . . as a last resort to collect taxes that it has been unable to collect from the employer 
or other payor,” rather than imposing it as an additional penalty. Mary B. Hevener, More 
Carrots, Fewer Sticks: Why Employers Should Be Offered in Payroll Tax and Executive Compensation 
Audits All the Protections of Rev. Proc. 64-22, 29 VA. TAX REV. 187, 198–99 (2009). Failure to 
provide a required information report is subject to a penalty of $250 for each delinquent or 
incorrect information return, up to $3 million per calendar year. I.R.C. § 6721(a) (2018). 
326. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., A MORE FOCUSED STRATEGY IS 
NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS EGREGIOUS EMPLOYMENT TAX CRIMES 1 (Mar. 21, 2017) (“In 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, . . . [e]mployment taxes amounted to almost $2.3 trillion (69 percent) 
of the $3.3 trillion collected by the IRS.”). 
327. I.R.C. § 7501(a) (2018).
328. See IRM § 8.25.1.4(1) (Dec. 7, 2012) (“The Collection function has sole responsibility 
for recommending assertion of the TFRP. Examination function personnel may refer 
potential TFRP cases to Collection for investigation.”); see also Keith Fogg, Leaving Money on 
the Table and Providing an Incentive Not to Pay—The Story of a Flawed Collection Device, 5 
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 5 (2009) (“If a company files a [quarterly employment] tax return and 
on that return it lists a liability for which it does not remit payment, the IRS will assess the 
liability reported on the return and initiate the collection process. If a company fails to file  
a return, the IRS will usually notice that failure within a few months and initiate the 
collection process.”). 
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1. The information transparency of large firms
Transparency reduces the opportunity for firms to commit
fraud, just as it does for individuals: anyone being watched is much 
less likely to cheat.329 In addition, large and publicly traded firms 
typically must release significant amounts of information about 
their activities, and government regulators can parse this data to 
assess corporate regulatory compliance.330 For example, the United 
Kingdom has developed a big-data system called CONNECT that 
combines data from more than 30 databases for tax enforcement 
purposes.331 In the United States, publicly traded firms are subject 
to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
are generally required to submit detailed financial performance 
reports, including the annual Form 10-K, the quarterly Form 10-Q, 
and the periodic Form 8-K.332 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, corporate officers must personally certify the contents of these 
reports.333 Other countries also have provisions for data sharing.334 
329. See Leandra Lederman, The Fraud Triangle and Tax Evasion, 106 Iowa L. Rev. __ 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 29–30), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339558. 
330. See Peter V. Letsou, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance Regulation in the 
United States: The Evolving Roles of the Federal and State Governments, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
149, 149 (2009) (“Since the 1930s, the United States federal government and the individual 
states have shared the responsibility for regulating the governance of public corporations.”); 
Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (2013) (“The . . . [SEC] 
has long promulgated regulations that say how much and what type of 
information corporations must disclose.”); cf. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the 
Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 666 (2006) (“Institutions, usually in the 
form of corporations, are easier to regulate because they are smaller in number, have known 
locations, and have significant economic incentives to comply with government mandates.”). 
331. Paul Rigney, The All Seeing Eye—An HMRC Success Story?, HMRC ADMIN., Nov.–
Dec. 2016, at 8, https://www.ifa.org.uk/media/653935/Tax-HMRC-Connect-system.pdf. 
332. See Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answers-form10khtm.html (last updated June 26, 2009). These financial statements 
require firms to list certain tax attributes. For instance, firms include a tax footnote to disclose 
material differences between book income and taxable income. See Jana S. Raedy et al., Is 
There Information in the Tax Footnote? 1 (Dec. 17, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1686036. 
333. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012)). 
334. The Austrian tax administration has access to “several databases including the 
land register . . . [and] the central register for associations,” and “[a]ll authorities of the 
federal state, the provinces, the municipalities and the municipality associations and  
the other self-administering entities are obliged to provide mutual assistance within the 
scope of their competences.” TINA EHRKE-RABEL & CHRISTINA SCHWARZENBACHER, 
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This information may increase tax enforcement both directly 
and indirectly. For example, the IRS’s Large and Mid-Size Business 
division uses the reports required of publicly traded companies in 
preparing for audit.335 Professor Susan Morse has argued that 
“enforcement efforts wholly unrelated to tax have had a positive 
impact on tax compliance because they produce general liability 
concerns within organizations . . . .”336 And, in fact, an SEC 
investigation may trigger a parallel IRS investigation.337 
In addition to this general regulatory transparency, large U.S. 
firms have to be fairly transparent to the IRS. First, there are 
disclosure rules. It has long been the case that adequate disclosure 
may protect a taxpayer taking reporting positions having merely a 
“reasonable basis” from accuracy-related penalties.338 In recent 
years, however, the IRS has also imposed affirmative disclosure 
requirements first on corporations with assets of $100 million or 
more and then on corporations with assets of $10 million. If such 
corporations set aside a reserve in their financial statements for an 
uncertain tax position, they must then file Schedule UTP.339 
“Schedule UTP is intended to capture the information that business 
taxpayers reported to their financial auditors for the purpose of 
establishing reserves for uncertain tax positions under the financial 
TAX TRANSPARENCY—NATIONAL REPORT AUSTRIA § 2.2.2.2 (2018), http://www.eatlp.org/ 
uploads/public/2018/National%20Report_Austria.pdf. Similarly, in Hungary, the tax 
agency can access all public records databases free of charge, and generally “is entitled to 
receive information on request from the database of any other branches of state and local 
administration and state registries.” ISTVÁN SIMON, TAX TRANSPARENCY: NATIONAL 
REPORT—HUNGARY § 2.2.2(b) (2018), http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/2018/ 
National%20Report_Hungary.pdf. 
335. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the 
Post-SOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 89 (2007). 
336. Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter 
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 964 (2006). 
337. Pearson & Mark, supra note 335, at 88 (“Most commonly, SEC investigations have 
their counterparts in tax audits by the IRS or investigations by the DOJ. Parallel 
investigations are often initiated when one government agency provides information to 
another agency.”). 
338. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2003).
339. Cherie J. Hennig & Blaise M. Sonnier, Schedule UTP: IRS Mandates Disclosure of 
Uncertain Tax Positions, TAX ADVISER (May 1, 2011), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/ 
issues/2011/may/hennig-may2011.html. 
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reporting process required by [GAAP].”340 The Schedule UTP 
requirement may deter firms from taking aggressive tax positions 
because they may be reluctant to provide the IRS with an 
audit roadmap.341 
Second, there are audits. In the U.S. federal income tax system, 
many large corporations are under continuous audit. The IRS 
assigns large firms to its “Coordinated Industry Case” program 
using a system that takes into account such factors as gross assets, 
gross receipts, and foreign tax liabilities.342 Empirical studies find 
that an increased audit rate corresponds with greater tax 
compliance, including for corporations.343 
340. Anson H. Asbury, Schedule UTP: The Early Returns Are In, J. ACCT. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2012/nov/20126022.html. Although to 
date neither Congress nor the IRS has imposed a specific penalty for firms that fail to file a 
required Schedule UTP or that fail to submit an accurate schedule, the ordinary accuracy-
related penalty under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 6662 or the failure-to-file 
penalty under Code section 6651 could potentially apply to firms that fail to disclose 
transactions reportable on Schedule UTP. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Don’t Be So Certain: IRS 
Appears to Be Disappointed in Corporate Schedule UTP Filings, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2012, 4:57 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2012/03/27/dont-be-so-certain-irs-appears-to-
be-disappointed-in-corporate-schedule-utp-filings/#2cb90fab1cdb; Robert A. Mathers & 
Mark Kmiecik, Tax Practice Responsibilities Involved in Schedule UTP, J. ACCT. (Apr. 13, 2015), 
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2015/apr/irs-schedule-utp.html. But cf. 
Michael J. Desmond & Ronald L. Buch, Jr., Practical Considerations for Schedule UTP . . . an 
Addendum, TAX EXECUTIVE, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 265, 269, https://www.morganlewis.com/-
/media/files/docs/archive/utp-addendum_6220pdf.ashx (“In the short term, we expect 
penalties will not be an issue, though this could change if the IRS perceives a problem. In 
that case, given the hurdles that would have to be overcome in order to impose a failure to 
file penalty, it would likely be incumbent on the IRS to pursue targeted penalty legislation.”). 
341. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, Lower Tax Reserves Hint at Possible Effects of UTP Reporting, 
136 TAX NOTES 1371 (2012) (exploring the possibility that firms have reduced their tax 
reserves, despite higher profits, either because Schedule UTP motivated firms to work with 
the IRS to address uncertainty or because they simply took less aggressive positions). 
342. See IRM § 4.46.2.5 (Mar. 1, 2006).
343. See, e.g., James Alm, Tax Compliance and Administration, in HANDBOOK ON 
TAXATION 741, 756 (W. Bartley Hildreth & James A. Richardson eds., 1999) (“Nearly all 
studies have found that a higher (random) audit rate leads to more compliance . . . . [T]his 
impact appears to be small and nonlinear, so that the deterrent effect of a higher audit rate 
eventually diminishes.”); Nipoli Kamdar, Corporate Income Tax Compliance: A Time Series 
Analysis, 25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 37, 46 (1997) (finding in a study of corporate income tax 
compliance using IRS data that “the fraction of true tax liability reported increases by 0.336 
of a percentage point when the audit rate increases by a percentage point”). 
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Relatedly, many large firms have voluntarily submitted to 
examination.344 Under the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP),  
the IRS and taxpayer work together to achieve tax compliance by 
resolving issues prior to the filing of the tax return. Successful 
conclusion of CAP allows the IRS to achieve an acceptable level of 
assurance regarding the accuracy of the taxpayer’s filed tax return 
and to substantially shorten the length of the post filing 
examination.345  
The IRS is not alone in its cooperative approach to business-firm 
compliance; similar systems are in place in many other countries.346 
2. Other pressures
The information flows required or driven by tax and non-tax
regulation, discussed in the previous section, help to explain the 
344. The IRS announced in 2011 that it was expanding its prefiling examination 
program known as the Compliance Assurance Process (CAP), which it had previously run 
as a pilot program. I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-32, IRS Expands and Makes Permanent Its 
Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) for Large Corporate Taxpayers (Mar. 31, 2011), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-11-032.pdf. The IRS stated that “in FY 2011 there 
[were] 140 taxpayers participating. Only taxpayers with assets of $10 million or more [were] 
eligible to participate.” Id. In 2012, Professor Leigh Osofsky wrote: “The list of CAP users is 
becoming a veritable who’s who of major corporations. Companies such as General Motors, 
Pfizer, Wendy’s, Prudential, Estee Lauder, J.C. Penny, and Intel have participated in CAP.” 
Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121, 123 
(2012). In addition, “[m]any other prominent companies including, in particular, technology 
companies, have indicated informally their participation in CAP without formally indicating 
their participation in CAP in SEC filings or otherwise.” Id. at 123 n.18. 
345. Compliance Assurance Process, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
corporations/compliance-assurance-process (last updated Feb. 27, 2020).  In September 2019, 
the IRS announced that it would begin accepting new applications from corporations that 
desire to participate in CAP, after having suspended new applications for several years.  Id.; 
see also IRS Reopens CAP Applications in Expansion of Program, WINSTON & STRAWN (Nov. 20, 
2019), https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/irs-reopens-cap-applications-in-
expansion-of-program.html (“It is expected that the IRS could admit an additional 50 to 100 
participants to the CAP program . . . . According to the [Internal Revenue] Service, the CAP 
program is still a work in progress and does not have a predetermined number of taxpayers 
who will be admitted.”). 
346. See OECD, CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE: A FRAMEWORK—FROM ENHANCED 
RELATIONSHIP TO CO-OPERATIVE COMPLIANCE 22–24 tbl.2.1 (2013), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/co-operative-compliance-a-framework_9789264200852-en (listing 24 
countries, including the United States, that responded to a survey saying “that they have 
developed and/or implemented a co-operative compliance model” and providing a 
description for each listed country); Osofsky, supra note 344, at 314 n.82 (stating that “[o]ther 
countries around the world have also begun to embrace the CAP model,” and mentioning 
Australia, the Netherlands, and South Korea). 
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relatively high degree of business-firm compliance, at least in 
the U.S. tax system. Beyond those regulatory pressures, firms are 
subject to additional external and internal pressures that help drive 
the firm’s decisionmakers to comply. Some external pressures 
vary by type of firm: for example, family firms may face 
distinct pressures.347 
There are also pressures from within a firm. Any stakeholder 
who learns of a collusive strategy could undermine it. It only takes 
one employee or self-interested accountant to place a phone call to 
the taxing authority,348 and the possibility of whistleblower 
compensation, which exists in the federal tax law,349 only increases 
347. A 2010 study of a sample of S&P Composite 1500 firms found that family firms—
i.e., those for which “members of the founding family continue to hold positions in top 
management, are on the board, or are blockholders of the company”—tend to take less 
aggressive tax positions than non-family firms. Shuping Chen et al., Are Family Firms More 
Tax Aggressive Than Non-Family Firms?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 42, 44–45 (2010). From a sample of 
firm activity between 1996 and 2000, the authors concluded that “family firms exhibit lower 
tax aggressiveness than their non-family counterparts, as demonstrated by their higher 
effective tax rates and lower book-tax differences.” Id. at 42–43. The authors point out that 
the cost of maintaining tax aggressiveness is high for a family firm because (1) outside 
investors and minority shareholders may perceive that the family is using their aggressive 
position to extract rents and may price-protect and bid the firm’s overall price down, and (2) 
family owners who aim to retain their ownership stake for the long term are more likely to 
appear on the taxing authority’s radar, sooner or later, than are shareholders who invest in 
a non-family firm for a finite period of time. Id. at 44–45. The authors further argue that the 
characteristic under-diversification of family firm owners’ investment portfolios and the 
desire to maintain the family’s good name in the industry may tip the balance away from 
aggressiveness and toward compliance. Id. at 45. 
348. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 75, at 729 n.196 (“[T]here is always 
the risk of defection, both on the part of employees not participating in the collusion, and on 
the part of those who participate but, for example, decide that they want more money to 
keep their end of the bargain.”); see also Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: 
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. 
L. REV. 91, 123 n.212 (2007) (“The Internal Revenue Service has found that many tax fraud 
whistleblowers target ex-spouses.”). 
349. See I.R.C. § 7623(b) (2018) (granting authority to the Whistleblower Office to award 
whistleblowers 15–30% of the proceeds of any administrative or judicial action brought as 
the result of information provided by an individual, and no more than 10% if the information 
the individual provided was principally based on publicly available information). 
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this risk.350 And “tips are by far the most common initial detection 
method” for fraud in general.351 
Cui argues that “the basic reason that large firms are more likely 
to be compliant is not that the probability of motivated 
whistleblowers is higher in them.”352 However, the prospect of 
whistleblowing helps deter fraud because it increases the 
likelihood of detection.353 Moreover, the larger the firm, the greater 
the risk that some participant in the scheme or other insider might 
defeat or expose it.354 Thus, the large firms that Cui contemplates as 
participants in a cooperative exchange with the government are 
particularly unlikely to facilitate tax evasion, not because of their 
inherent goodness but because it is extremely difficult to operate a 
conspiracy indefinitely on a large scale.355 
At a large firm, typically even the tax group is large. “At a 
typical public corporation, the tax director has responsibility for 
making or recommending tax decisions. . . . Depending on the size 
of the corporation, the tax director’s staff can vary from two or three 
350. See Kleven et al., supra note 6, at 220 (“Breakdowns can also occur as a result of 
rational whistleblowing if the government provides rewards to whistleblowers and firms 
cannot make employees commit not to whistleblow ex ante.”); Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, 
False Claims, Not Securities Fraud: Towards Corporate Governance by Whistleblowers, 15 NEXUS 
55, 61 (2009–10) (“[E]mployees account for 46% of fraud detection where a qui tam bounty is 
available, and just 16.3% of fraud detection elsewhere.”). 
In some instances, whistleblowers could recover awards from multiple agencies. For 
example, a whistleblower who first reports corporate misconduct to another government 
agency may submit that same information to the SEC within 120 days, in which case the SEC 
will treat the information as though it had been submitted to the SEC in the first instance. 
Press Release, SEC, SEC Awards More Than $2.2 Million to Whistleblower Who First 
Reported Information to Another Federal Agency Before SEC (Apr. 5, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-58. 
351. ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, supra note 260, at 7. 
352. Cui, supra note 6, at 138. 
353. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall 
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 108 (2012) 
(“[I]ncreased whistleblowing raises the likelihood of detection, thus reducing the opportunity 
to commit fraud.”); see also id. (“Whistleblowing is the single most effective way to  
detect fraud.”). 
354. Cf. Yaniv, supra note 317, at 314 (finding this in a model of the evasion decision).
355. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1312 (2003) 
(“The more conspirators, the more witnesses there are to flip and the more ominous the 
prisoners’ dilemma for a conspirator.”); cf. David Robert Grimes, On the Viability of 
Conspiratorial Beliefs, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 9 (2016) (explaining in the context of alleged scientific 
conspiracy theories that “[t]his [collapse] problem appears insurmountable for any large 
conspiracy; if it requires constant upkeep . . . then odds of failure approach unity with time”). 
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individuals to twenty or more.”356 A 2016 KPMG survey found that 
“[o]n average, tax functions of respondent organizations have 16 
full-time employees (FTE) at their tax department headquarters 
location, and an average of 27 FTEs at other locations.”357 
Moreover, the internal tax staff rarely acts alone; rather, it 
regularly hires outside advisors, such as law firms and accounting 
firms.358 Morse explains that after Sarbanes-Oxley, tax directors 
often have to hire different advisors for different purposes.359 The 
presence of many people, i.e., “at least four tax or accounting 
specialists who bridge . . . the audit firm, the tax planning firm, and 
the corporate tax department,” means that “[e]ach group member’s 
ability to control information . . . is accordingly more limited.”360 
This dispersion of information makes it that much harder to 
prevent defections from a collusive agreement.361 
Cui argues that “although whistleblower programs operated by 
tax and other regulatory agencies have attracted attention in recent 
years, their role in the history of tax and other areas of regulatory 
enforcement has been minimal.”362 However, the IRS 
whistleblower program has become much more important since 
Congress created the IRS Whistleblower Office and enhanced 
recoveries under Code section 7623, both of which happened in 
2006.363 In its 2019 annual report, the Whistleblower Office found 
that the IRS collected approximately $5.7 billion since 2007 thanks 
to the whistleblower program, and that it paid out tax 
whistleblower awards of approximately $932 million in that time.364 
From 2018 through 2019 alone, the IRS collected a total of over 
$2 billion thanks to whistleblowers.365 
356. Morse, supra note 336, at 964–65 (footnotes omitted). 
357. KPMG, A LOOK INSIDE TAX DEPARTMENTS WORLDWIDE AND HOW THEY ARE 
EVOLVING 3 (2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/11/ 
global-tax-benchmarking-survey.pdf. 
358. Morse, supra note 336, at 965. 
359. Id. at 966. 
360. Id. at 967. 
361. See supra note 354. 
362. Cui, supra note 6, at 130. 
363. See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432 § 406(a), 120 Stat. 2922, 
2958; I.R.C. § 7623(b) (2018); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX 
LAW. 357, 361–62 (2008). 
364. IRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
8 (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy19_wo_annual_report_final.pdf. 
365. Id. tbl.1. 
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In addition, the amounts the IRS has reported collecting as a 
result of whistleblower information may be underinclusive. In a 
2018 report, the GAO stated: 
Prior to February 9, 2018, when Congress enacted a statutory 
change requiring the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to include 
penalties for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) 
violations in calculating whistleblower awards, IRS interpreted 
the whistleblower law to exclude these penalties from awards. 
However, GAO found that some whistleblowers provided 
information about FBAR noncompliance to IRS. In a sample of 132 
whistleblower claims closed between January 2012 and July 2017, 
GAO found that IRS assessed FBAR penalties in 28 cases. It is 
unknown whether the whistleblower’s information led IRS to take 
action in all of these cases. These penalties totaled approximately 
$10.7 million. Had they been included in whistleblower awards, 
total awards could have increased up to $3.2 million.366 
The bottom line is that the decision whether to collude with 
employees is not a simple matter of one or two people weighing the 
tax gains against the statistical probability of being selected for 
audit. The decision is far more complex, and the larger the firm, the 
higher the likelihood that collusion will be detected or exposed one 
way or another. 
This insight is important for a question that Cui does not 
explicitly raise, as well. As noted in section I.A,367 in criticizing the 
effectiveness of TPIR, Cui correctly argues that it does not play an 
obvious role in the administration of the corporate income tax.368 
Yet the IRS has estimated voluntary compliance with the corporate 
tax in recent years at 82 or 83 percent of dollars due.369 If 
information reporting is not responsible, what is?  
366. GAO, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM: IRS NEEDS TO IMPROVE DATA CONTROLS FOR 
SOME AWARD DETERMINATIONS intro. (2018). 
367. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
368. For example, in the United States corporations typically do not receive information 
reporting forms from their employees, customers, or suppliers. Cui, supra note 6, at 104. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the corporate income tax generally “is not a major source of revenue 
in the western world. It provided an average of 8.7 percent of government revenue in the EU 
in 1998.” Paul Webley, Tax Compliance by Businesses, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC 
CRIME 96–97 (Hans Sjögren & Göran Skogh, eds., 2004). That figure was similar as recently 
as 2013, when it was 8.5 percent. See KYLE POMERLEAU & KEVIN ADAMS, SOURCES OF 
GOVERNMENT REVENUE IN THE OECD, 2016, at 2 chart 1 (2016). In the United States, the 
corporate income tax provided 8.4 percent of federal tax revenues in 2013. Id. at 3 chart 2. 
369. See infra notes 372–73 and accompanying text.
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The information transparency discussed in this section 
likely explains much of this corporate compliance. Interestingly, 
the compliance rate of individuals with respect to income 
amounts subject to partial information reporting is estimated at 
similar levels: 83 percent of dollars due in the most recent 
IRS study, and 81 percent in the previous one.370 In other 
words, corporations’ overall tax compliance behavior generally 
corresponds to that of individuals with respect to income items that 
are partially transparent. 
C. Putting the Contrarian Theory to the Test: What Happens When
Individuals Are the Information Reporters? 
In line with his argument that firms are pro-social and 
information reporting is relatively unimportant, Cui argues that 
imposing an excise tax on a firm would be as effective as instead 
collecting that tax from an individual with withholding required by 
the firm.371 Note that this argument implies that the addition of an 
individual to the two-party relationship of firm/government 
would not increase compliance. That is an empirically testable 
proposition, and the empirical evidence is to the contrary. 
First, IRS data are suggestive. They show that corporations’ 
voluntary compliance rate with the federal income tax (a two-party 
relationship) is eight to ten percentage points lower than the 
voluntary compliance rate of individuals subject to substantial 
information reporting (a three-party relationship that includes an 
individual in addition to a firm and the government).372 
370. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
371. See Cui, supra note 6, at 114 (“[T]ax can be effectively collected from wages and 
financial income through withholding or, equivalently administratively, payor excise 
taxation.”); see also id. (“There has been no study to show that TPIR is more effective than 
withholding or excise taxation . . . . This implies that no evidence has been produced that 
‘but for’ TPIR, the level of compliance could not be as high as is actually observed.”). 
372. See TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 3, at 11 tbl.3, 12 chart 
1 (reporting estimated voluntary compliance rates of 83% for corporations and 93% for 
individuals subject to substantial information reporting without withholding); TAX GAP 
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 2, at 13 tbl.3, 14 fig.3 (reporting for 2011–13 
estimated voluntary compliance rates of 86% and 95%, respectively); see also id. at 13 tbl.3 
(changing estimate 2008–10 corporate tax voluntary compliance rate from 83% to 85% to 
reflect a change in methodology). 
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That difference is consistent over time across IRS studies.373 This 
simple comparison supports the intuitive principle that the 
addition of a third-party reporter adds value beyond what the mere 
participation of a firm has to offer.374 
But those are simply aggregate statistics. If Cui’s hypothesis is 
correct, then firms should be equally compliant regardless of 
whether they are the subject of TPIR. As it turns out, there are some 
instances in which firms are subject to third-party reporting by 
individuals. Empirical studies of such contexts have found that 
such reporting by individuals results in greater tax compliance 
by the firms. This evidence supports our argument that it is 
information reporting, not the presence of a firm, that increases 
tax compliance. 
For instance, Kumler et al. studied a pension reform initiative 
in Mexico.375 The reform tied younger workers’ pensions more 
closely to reported wages, giving younger workers an incentive to 
monitor their employers’ wage reporting, as well as the 
information to do so.376 Prior to the reform, workers’ pensions 
373. See IRS, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX YEAR 2006 TAX GAP ESTIMATION
3 tbl.2, 4 chart 1 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06rastg12workppr.pdf (reporting 
2006 voluntary compliance rates as 82% for corporations and 92% for individuals subject to 
substantial information reporting without withholding); id. at 3 tbl.2 (2001 corporate 
voluntary compliance rate was 82%); IRS, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: NET TAX GAP 
AND REMITTANCE GAP ESTIMATES (SUPPLEMENT TO PUBLICATION 7285) 2 tbl.1 (1990) 
(corporate voluntary compliance rate for 1992 was 81.1 to 88.1%); id. at 2 (“If we have 
correctly estimated the extent to which examiners cannot detect all tax deficiencies, then the 
‘true’ tax gaps (or VCRs) lie between these two sets of estimates.”); IRS, TAX YEAR 2001 
FEDERAL TAX GAP 3 (2006), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf (2001 
voluntary compliance rate for individuals subject to substantial information reporting 
without withholding was 95.5%); GAO, TAX GAP: MULTIPLE STRATEGIES, BETTER 
COMPLIANCE DATA, AND LONG-TERM GOALS ARE NEEDED TO IMPROVE TAXPAYER 
COMPLIANCE 6 fig.1 (2005) (1992 voluntary compliance rate for individuals subject to 
substantial information reporting without withholding was 95.8%). 
374. This accords with the idea that numerosity helps foster tax compliance. That is, 
generally speaking, the more people who will know about a fraud and will have to be 
induced to refrain from reporting it, the less likely fraud is to occur. See supra text 
accompanying notes 64–65; supra text accompanying notes 354–55. 
375. Kumler et al., supra note 275, at 4 (“This reform replaced the entire PAYGO 
pension system with a system of personal retirement accounts . . . .”). The reform took place 
because of concerns that the old pension system was not financially viable. Id. 
376. Id. at 9. The authors explain:
Another aspect of the pension reform . . . is that the law requires AFOREs 
[Retirement Savings Fund Administrators] to send an account statement to each 
holder of a personal retirement account every four months. . . . It appears that 
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generally were not affected by the wages employers reported, as 
long as the employer reported the minimum permissible wage.377 
The result of the reform was that firms reduced underreporting of 
wages (and thus payroll tax evasion) for younger workers.378 
Similarly, Joana Naritomi studied the Nota Fiscal Paulista 
(NFP) program in São Paulo, Brazil, which was designed to 
decrease retail firms’ VAT evasion. The NFP provided consumers 
with incentives in the form of tax rebates and lottery participation 
for requesting receipts, as well as for checking the retailers’ reports 
of their transactions online.379 Naritomi estimated that the NFP 
increased retailers’ reported revenues by at least 21 percent over 
four years.380 
Junmin Wan similarly found that a receipt lottery increased tax 
payments. He explains that, in China, a 2001 law required retailers 
in certain provinces to install a machine that printed an official 
receipt with a lottery number.381 The result of the introduction of 
the receipt lottery was a 21.5% to 24.2% increase by retailers in sales 
tax payments.382 These results were statistically significant.383 
A number of other countries likewise have used receipt lotteries 
or tax rebates to increase the incentive for consumers to request an 
these account statements made it significantly easier for workers to discover how 
much employers were contributing on their behalf. 
Id. 
377. Id. at 2, 6, 7 (“[A]pproximately 80 percent of retirees were receiving the minimum 
pension prior to the reform . . . .”). 
378. Id. at 20. (“The key finding is that, across the three measures of evasion, we see 
little evidence of a differential pre-trend but robust evidence of a relative decrease in evasion 
for the younger age groups following the passage of the reform. The wage gap (medians) 
measure takes a bit longer than the wage gap (means) measure to show statistically 
significant relative decline, but the fact that we see a similar pattern across the three measures 
is reassuring.”). 
379. Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 3031, 3043–44 (2019). 
380. Id. at 3052 (“The results suggest that the NFP program induced a positive and 
significant 21% increase in reported revenue by firms across the 4-year period following 
implementation. Because I am exploiting differences in the treatment intensity across firms, 
the estimated effect is likely a lower bound of the program’s impact.”). 
381. Wan, supra note 39, at 613 (“[B]y the end of 2002 there were over 80 big-city-level 
local tax bureaus countrywide (out of approximately 662) where the experiment was under 
way. In other words, 12% of local tax bureaus [participated].”). 
382. Id. at 617. 
383. Id. (“For sales tax revenue, the ΔLRE coefficients are significant, ranging from 
84.355 to 105.676, and the elasticities of experiment from 0.171 to 0.213.”). 
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invoice.384 For example, “[t]he lottery receipt system appeared 
and was used by Taiwan in the 1950s to improve tax 
collection efficiency; it is still operative. The Republic of Korea also 
‘imported’ this system from Taiwan in the 1990s, and the new 
revised system seems to work well.”385 The idea is that when 
retailers know a transaction is not invisible—because the consumer 
requests a receipt and might submit it to the government—retailers 
are more likely to comply with their tax reporting and 
payment obligations.386 
Cui characterizes such lotteries as a “third-party reporting 
device that has received frequent favorable comments from 
academics in recent years, but is perceived to deliver only very 
mixed results in the real world.”387 However, any such “perceived” 
384. See, e.g., Berhan & Jenkins, Economic Cost, supra note 134, at 93–96 (discussing such 
a program in Northern Cyprus); Dragoș Mihai Ungureanu & Elena-Doina Dascălu, Tax 
Lottery Receipts in Romania, a Different Approach to Fight Against Tax Evasion, 2015 PROCEDIA 
ECON. & BUS. ADMIN. 267, 268–72, http://icesba.eu/RePEc/icb/wpaper/ICESBA2015_ 
33Ungureanu_p267-275.pdf (describing receipt lotteries in Malta, Slovakia, Portugal, and 
Romania); Junmin Wan, A Solution to Tax Evasion (Ctr. for Advanced Econ. Study, Working 
Paper No. WP-2009-09, 2009) (discussing such a program in Taiwan, which began in 1950). 
385. Wan, supra note 39, at 612–13. 
386. See Marco Fabbri & Sigrid Hemels, ‘Do You Want a Receipt?’ Combating VAT and 
RST Evasion with Lottery Tickets, 41 INTERTAX 430, 435–36 (2013) (Making receipts into lottery 
tickets in China reflects “[t]he idea . . . that customers will be incentivized to ask for an 
invoice and thus oblige the service provider to pay BT [business tax]. . . . Once the receipt is 
issued, the seller cannot evade BT on that transaction. Thus, the buyer has a direct incentive 
to ask for the receipt and this indirectly obliges the seller to reveal information to the tax 
authorities.”); Wan, supra note 39, at 613 (“LRE [Lottery Receipt Experiment] can work as an 
incentive mechanism that can mitigate the information asymmetry between the government 
and the taxpayer.”). 
387. Cui, supra note 6, at 119–20. In support of this statement, Cui cites two papers for 
“critical discussion of real-world experience.” Id. at 120 n.124. They are: (1) a report by the 
International Monetary Fund, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT CHALLENGES IN 
REVENUE MOBILIZATION: IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE 29–30 (2015) [hereinafter IMF], 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2015/020215a.pdf; and (2) a working paper by 
Fooken et al., Jonas Fooken et al., Improving VAT Compliance—Random Awards for Tax 
Compliance (European Comm’n Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 51-2014, 2014). Cui 
states that the International Monetary Fund’s paper “highlight[s] the limits of lottery 
schemes.” Cui, supra note 6, at 120 n.124. That paper states that several countries have used 
receipt lotteries and cites Naritomi’s positive finding. IMF, supra, at 30. Its critique relates to 
the role of such techniques in the greater enforcement scheme: 
There have been very few careful evaluations of these schemes, which should not 
be regarded—as some [revenue administrations] appear to have done—as 
alternatives to effective auditing. . . . [A] lottery ticket may have much less value 
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effect does not accord with the empirical evidence to date. While 
some tax lotteries have not yet been systematically evaluated,388 the 
evidence from both São Paulo’s and China’s receipt lotteries, 
discussed above,389 supports the notion that the addition of a third-
party information reporter increases firms’ compliance. 
That is not to say that receipt lotteries are a perfect tool, or that 
they should replace other forms of enforcement.390 And lotteries can 
be expensive, although generally some prizes go unclaimed, which 
reduces the cost.391 But even if the cost of a receipt lottery in a 
particular country exceeds the tax revenue produced, that does not 
in itself mean that third-party reporting is ineffective to increase tax 
compliance. Rather, it suggests that the total cost of prizes may 
need to be reduced if the lottery is to be continued to be used as a 
compliance tool in that country. 
Thus, the evidence from São Paulo’s and China’s receipt 
lotteries suggests that the addition of a third-party information 
reporter increases tax compliance by firms. In fact, the studies by 
to the consumer than evading VAT on a big ticket purchase. Such schemes clearly 
cannot be the centerpiece of an effective compliance strategy. 
Id. 
Cui quotes the Fooken et al. paper as stating, “While there is growing interest in the 
use of tax lotteries throughout Europe, the understanding of best practises [sic] and success 
factors is still limited.” Cui, supra note 6, at 120 n.124 (alteration in original) (quoting Fooken 
et al., supra, at 3). That observation does not appear critical of real-world experience. The 
Fooken et al. paper discusses a one-day workshop in which “European countries who had 
already a lottery scheme in place (Malta, Slovakia, Portugal) were invited to present their 
experiences . . . together with interested countries, to discuss the specificities.” Fooken et al., 
supra, at 3. According to the paper, the talks and discussion were generally quite positive. 
See generally id. In fact, as Cui states, a focus of the workshop was “to bring together countries 
with experience and those interested in running tax lotteries.” Cui, supra note 6, at 120 n.127. 
388. See IMF, supra note 387, at 30 (“There have been very few careful evaluations of 
these schemes . . . .”); Ungureanu & Dascălu, supra note 384, at 269 (“While no major data 
analysis takes place in the course of the [Malta receipt] lottery, some figures have been 
recorded.”); id. at 272 (“While no evaluation of the lottery scheme [in Portugal] exists, it can 
be considered a success and further steps are currently in planning . . . .”). 
389. See supra text accompanying notes 379–80; supra text accompanying notes 381–83. 
390. See IMF, supra note 387, at 30 (“[T]hese schemes . . . should not be regarded—as 
some [revenue administrations] appear to have done—as alternatives to effective auditing.”). 
391. Naritomi stated that in São Paulo, as of 2011, only 50 percent of the prizes had been 
collected. Naritomi, supra note 379, at 3067. Wan reported that the Beijing tax bureau only 
paid out only 16.7% of the available prize money. Wan, supra note 39, at 613. In Puerto Rico, 
only 7% of winners of the automatic lottery (which did not require the consumer to register 
receipts) claimed their prizes. Marian Diaz, El Fin de Sorteo del IVU Loto, ENDI (Sept. 2, 2015, 
12:00 AM), https://www.elnuevodia.com/negocios/consumo/nota/elfindelsorteodelivuloto-
2094062/. 
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Kumler et al., Naritomi, and Wan all found, in different contexts, 
that third-party reporting by individuals improves business firms’ 
compliance. These studies were not designed to test whether large 
firms are more compliant in the presence of TPIR by individuals, 
but together they cast significant doubt on Cui’s claim that an excise 
tax on a corporation would work just as well as an income tax on 
an individual paired with third-party reporting and withholding.392 
Instead, these studies support the intuitive notion that having a 
third party—someone who is not the taxpayer—report the 
transaction to the government improves tax compliance. 
Granted, these studies are not exhaustive, and there plainly is 
space for additional empirical research. In calling attention to this 
gap in the literature, Professor Cui’s article makes a helpful 
contribution. But his article fails to introduce evidence 
contradicting the studies showing that TPIR is an important tool for 
tax administration. 
CONCLUSION 
While legal and economics scholars generally recognize that the 
government needs information about taxpayers’ transactions in 
order to enforce tax laws, Professor Wei Cui’s recent article 
disputes that understanding. It asserts, counterintuitively, that 
“modern governments can practice ‘taxation without 
information.’”393 Cui’s argument rests on two claims: (1) 
information sharing does not “explain the success of modern tax 
administration”;394 and (2) the pro-social nature of business firms, 
particularly large firms, does explain that success. According to 
Professor Cui, what scholars have observed as the success of 
information reporting is instead attributable to the inherent 
honesty of firms. 
This Article has shown that both claims are mistaken. Although 
Professor Cui’s assertions are provocative, his article does not 
provide evidence to support its contrarian thesis. Instead, the 
empirical evidence, discussed above, demonstrates not only that 
392. Cui, supra note 6, at 114 (“[T]ax can be effectively collected from wages 
and financial income through withholding or, equivalently administratively, payor  
excise taxation.”). 
393. Id. at 146. 
394. Id. at 99. 
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information matters in tax enforcement but also that TPIR can be 
effective even where individuals, not firms, are the information 
reporters. The studies show that inserting an individual into the 
transaction as a third-party reporter increases compliance by firms. 
Thus, Professor Hemel’s agreement with Cui is misplaced, as well. 
Cui and Hemel also are incorrect in stating that VATs do not rely 
on third-party reporting of transaction information. On the 
contrary, modern VATs have moved to real-time reporting 
of transactions precisely because such information-sharing 
fosters compliance. 
Cui’s argument that firms are inherently inclined to comply 
with the law is also mistaken. While an increase in the number of 
people who would need to collaborate in fraud does seem to reduce 
fraud, there is no evidence that it need be in the context of a firm. 
Instead, the evidence suggests that regulation and monitoring 
greatly increase firms’ compliance, although they have by no 
means succeeded in eliminating malfeasance even on the part of 
large firms. In fact, as noted above, IRS data suggest that 
corporations are less compliant (by eight to ten percentage points) 
with the U.S. federal income tax than are individuals subject 
to substantial information reporting without withholding, 
underscoring the pro-compliance effect of the presence of a 
third party. 
Carefully researched contrarian theses can sometimes help 
push law and policy in new directions. However, in this case, 
the conventional wisdom holds fast: there can be no taxation 
without information. 
